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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
By 
DENVIL R. DUNCAN 
August 2010 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. James R. Alm 
Major Department: Economics 
This dissertation comprises two essays that attempt to determine, empirically, the 
relationship between personal income taxation and income inequality.  A key feature of 
the analysis is that it highlights the role played by behavioral responses in this 
relationship.  The first essay examines whether income inequality is affected by the 
structural progressivity of national income tax systems.  Using detailed personal income 
tax schedules for a large panel of countries, we develop and estimate comprehensive, 
time-varying measures of structural progressivity of national income tax systems over the 
1981–2005 period.  Our inequality measures are taken from a country-level dataset of 
GINI coefficients calculated separately for gross income, net income, and consumption.  
The relationship is estimated using two stage least squares to account for the endogeneity 
of the progressivity measures.  We use the weighted sum of progressivity measures in 
neighboring countries as instruments; each measure is weighted by population and 
distance.   
xi 
 
Our findings suggest that progressivity has a strong negative effect on inequality 
in reported gross and net income and that this negative effect is strongest in countries 
whose institutional framework supports pro-poor redistribution.  However, the effect of 
progressivity on true inequality, which is approximated by consumption-based measures 
of the GINI coefficient, is significantly smaller.  The results also show that tax 
progressivity has a much weaker effect on true inequality in countries with weak “law 
and order” and a large informal nontaxable sector.   
The second essay relies on household level data and complements the first in its 
empirical approach.  We simulate the distributional impact of the Russian personal 
income tax (PIT) following the flat tax reform of 2001 using data from the Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey.  We use a series of counterfactuals to decompose the 
change in the distribution of net income into a direct (tax) effect and an indirect 
behavioral effect.  The indirect effect is further decomposed into evasion and productivity 
effects using existing estimates of these respective elasticities.  Again, a distinction is 
made between reported income and true income (approximated by consumption) 
inequality.   
As expected, the direct tax effect increased net income inequality.  Changes in the 
pre-tax distribution (indirect effect), on the other hand, had a large negative impact on 
inequality thus leading to an overall decline in net income inequality.  We also find that 
the tax-induced evasion response increased reported net income inequality while reducing 
consumption based measures of net income inequality.  To the extent that consumption 
approximates true income, these results demonstrate that the PIT affects true income 
inequality differently than it does reported income inequality.  The results further imply 
xii 
 
xiii 
 
that countries with very large informal sectors may not be restricted by the equity 
efficiency trade-off and that redistribution policy should target gross income rather than 
the progressivity of the tax schedule. 
1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Countries throughout the world have made a major shift toward flatter personal 
income tax structures over the last two decades.  Since flattening the income tax structure 
reduces structural progressivity, many have argued that these flatter schedules may have 
reduced the ability of the personal income tax to redistribute income.  If this conclusion is 
correct, it casts serious doubts over the appropriateness of the trend towards linear 
personal income tax schedules that has been taking place in developing countries.  
Although very intuitive, it is not immediately clear that flattening personal income tax 
schedules will increase inequality.  This potentially counterintuitive result is especially 
possible in the presence of tax induced behavioral responses such as evasion.  Therefore, 
arguing for or against the adoption of a flatter personal income tax schedule requires a 
very detailed understanding of the relationship between structural progressivity and 
income inequality.1   
This dissertation comprises two essays that attempt to address the issue raised 
above.  The essays are inextricably linked by the concepts of “taxes and income 
distribution.”  The first essay seeks to determine, empirically, the relationship between 
the structural progressivity of personal income taxes and income inequality, with a 
special emphasis on the differential effect of progressivity on observed vs. actual  
 
                                                 
1 Another equally important consideration is the effect on efficiency.  However, we do not address this 
issue here.  The term structural progressivity denotes changes in the average tax rate along the income 
distribution.  In other words, it measures the rate at which tax rates increases with income.   
 
2 
inequality.2  Although a lot of work has been done to assess the impact of tax reforms on 
the distribution of income, this is the first known attempt to differentiate between these 
two effects.   
Verification of this possible differential effect is becoming increasingly important 
given the number of countries that have or are considering the implementation of tax 
reforms with tax structures much flatter than their predecessors (Sabirianova Peter, 
Buttrick, and Duncan 2010).  If progressive rates and income inequality are negatively 
related, then there are important implications of such policies for the distribution of 
income.  However, it is not clear that shifting to flat taxes – or more generally, to income 
tax structures with lower levels of structural progressivity – will necessarily lead to 
greater levels of income inequality.   
Another important contribution of this essay is that we use a unique dataset for a 
large panel of countries that contains time-varying, country-specific measures of 
structural progressivity of national personal income tax systems over the period 1981-
2005.  We develop and estimate several measures of structural progressivity for over one 
hundred countries worldwide by using complete national income tax schedules with 
statutory rates, thresholds, country-specific tax formulas and other information.  The 
measures are based on data definitions that are compatible across countries as well as 
over time.  This dataset allows our analysis to be different than most of the previous 
work, which has been country-specific incidence studies that rely on micro-simulation 
exercises or computable general equilibrium models (Altig and Carlstrom 1999; 
Martinez-Vazquez 2008). 
                                                 
2 Observed inequality refers to the inequality of reported income; i.e., income reported on surveys or tax 
returns.  True inequality, on the other hand, includes both reported and hidden income.   
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The key prediction of our theoretical framework is that progressivity affects 
observed inequality differently than it does true inequality, and that the difference 
between the two inequality effects is increasing with the extent of tax evasion and its 
responsiveness to tax changes, ceteris paribus.  To test this hypothesis, we use a country-
level dataset of GINI coefficients calculated separately for gross income, net income, and 
consumption.  We argue that the consumption-based measure of income is closer to true 
permanent income in comparison to disposable income reported in the household 
surveys.3   
Our empirical analysis reveals that while progressivity reduces observed 
inequality in reported gross and net income, it has a significantly smaller impact on 
inequality in consumption.  We theorize that the “positive” effect of progressivity on true 
inequality is possible, especially in the presence of weak legal institutions that can trigger 
a very large tax evasion response.  The evidence provides some support for our 
hypothesis as we show that weaker law and order produce a positive effect on inequality 
in consumption.  As expected, we find that progressivity has a larger negative effect on 
net income inequality than on gross income inequality.  
The second essay is an attempt to get a more detailed understanding of the 
relationship between tax rates and the distribution of income.  Numerous researchers 
have identified the fact that tax payers change their behavior in response to changes in tax 
rates.  While these behavioral changes are at the core of studies that look at efficiency 
and optimal tax policy4, little is known about their impact on income inequality.  The 
                                                 
3 The empirical micro literature on developing countries has long pointed out the unreliability of income 
measures in household budget surveys due to widespread under-reporting and called for the use of 
consumption-based measures of inequality (Deaton 1997; Milanovic 1999). 
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literature on taxes and income distribution has acknowledged that taxes have a direct 
effect and an indirect behavioral effect on inequality (Karoly 1994).  However, most of 
the previous studies fail to separate the two effects or identify the driving forces behind 
the indirect behavioral effect.5  
Therefore, the objective of the second essay is to (1) determine the relative size of 
the direct and indirect effects and (2) determine the relative size of the behavioral 
responses that are driving the indirect effect.  By relying on estimates of the various 
behavioral responses, the essay also identifies the true-tax induced-change in inequality.  
The analysis is done at the micro level using household surveys.  The key contribution of 
this essay is the identification of two main behavioral responses that drive the indirect 
effect (productivity and compliance).  Gramlich, Kasten, and Sammartino (1993) and 
Altig and Carlstrom (1999)are limited in this respect as they focus primarily on the labor 
supply response.6  At the same time, the analysis allows us to identify the true changes in 
the distribution of income. 
Another contribution is its implication for the commonly perceived trade-off 
between efficiency and equity.  To see this contribution, it is important to recognize that 
changes in inequality that arise from changes in evasion are artificial.  In other words, 
observed inequality can increase if a lower tax rate causes rich tax payers to report a 
relatively greater share of their income.  This increase in inequality represents a shift 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 See Saez (2001), Gruber and Saez (2002) and, Kumar (2008) for a description of two branches of the 
literature that discusses the importance of behavioral changes for efficiency and tax policy design. 
 
5 Alm, Lee, and Wallace (2005) and Poterba (2007) identify the direct and indirect effects while Gramlich, 
Kasten, and Sammartino (1993) and Altig and Carlstrom (1999) identify some of the behavioral responses 
that contribute to the indirect effect. 
 
6 Gramlich, Kasten, and Sammartino (1993) also included the response of capital gains. 
 
5 
 
toward the true inequality that existed prior to the tax change.  Therefore, to the extent 
that this “artificial” effect is relatively large, the actual equity cost of the efficiency 
gained from switching to a flatter tax schedule will be much lower than observed.  In this 
case, it is optimal to adopt a flatter tax schedule not only because it is more efficient but 
also because negative equity effects are smaller than we think (and possibly positive).  
Regardless of its size, the evasion (artificial) effect will play an important role in the 
optimal progressivity debate. 
The results are equally interesting if it turns out that the behavioral responses play 
a minor role in the determination of inequality.  Such a result would indicate that the 
indirect effect is small, which would then imply that the optimal tax schedule may be 
made more progressive with little efficiency costs.  Therefore, knowing if and how taxes 
affect the distribution of income and consumption is important for policy makers as they 
attempt to strike an important balance between efficiency and equity. 
It is important that we point out at this stage that this dissertation focuses on the 
personal income tax only.  As such, we ignore other aspects of the tax system and their 
possible feedback effects to the personal income tax.  It would be preferable to account 
for these, but the data requirements cannot be met.  In this respect, we follow a long and 
esteemed literature (Alm and Wallace 2007; Auten and Carroll 1999; Feldstein 1995; 
Gruber and Saez 2002; Kopczuk 2005). 
The remainder of the dissertation discusses each of the essays in greater detail.
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ESSAY 1: TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY  
Introduction 
The economic literature has long viewed efficiency and equity as two important 
objectives of economic development.  There is also a well established tradeoff between 
these two objectives; policies that tend to increase efficiency are also likely to increase 
inequality.  This efficiency-equity tradeoff is especially pronounced in income taxation 
(Mirrlees 1971; Ramsey 1927).  It is commonly believed that efficiency is best achieved 
by the use of simple lump sum taxes that do not distort the choices that people make, 
whereas vertical equity generally requires progressive tax schedules accompanied by 
individual specific deductions, allowances, and credits, which are distortionary.  As such, 
taxes that are efficient are thought to reduce equity and vice versa.   
But are these two objectives always in conflict?  Underlying this tradeoff is the 
presumption that a higher level of tax progressivity reduces income inequality.  It is not 
difficult to show that a structurally progressive tax (i.e., average tax rate increases with 
income) results in a more equal distribution of disposable income, assuming no 
behavioral responses to tax changes and holding redistribution constant.  In reality, 
however, behavioral responses should not be ignored.  For example, increased 
progressivity may lead to lower levels of tax compliance among the rich thus increasing 
their disposable income since they do not pay taxes on the hidden income.  An 
implication of this behavioral response is that both efficiency and equity are reduced as a 
result of the increased progressivity.  To the extent that the tax evasion response exists 
 
7 
and is significant, progressivity will have a different effect on observed inequality in 
reported income than on actual inequality in true income.  
Verification of this possible differential effect is becoming increasingly important 
given the number of countries that have or are considering the implementation of tax 
reforms with tax structures much flatter than their predecessors.  Sabirianova Peter, 
Buttrick, and Duncan (2010) shows that personal income tax (PIT) structures today have 
fewer tax brackets, lower top statutory marginal tax rates and reduced complexity than 25 
years ago.  They also identify what appears to be a shift towards flat rate income taxes.  
By 2009, 24 countries adopted the flat rate PIT schedule and many more countries are 
seriously considering this policy.  If progressivity and income inequality are negatively 
related, then there are important implications of such policies for the distribution of 
income.  Given the tax evasion argument, however, it is not clear that shifting to flat 
taxes – or more generally, to income tax structures with lower levels of progressivity – 
will necessarily lead to greater levels of income inequality.  This is where the distinction 
between observed and true income distribution and the potential differential effect of 
progressivity on both becomes extremely important. 
In this paper, we seek to determine, empirically, the relationship between 
structural progressivity of personal income taxes and income inequality, with a special 
emphasis on the differential effect of progressivity on observed vs. actual inequality.  
Although a lot of work has been done to assess the impact of tax reforms on inequality, 
this is the first known attempt to differentiate between these two effects.  Furthermore, 
for the first time, this paper uses a unique dataset for a large panel of countries that 
contains time-varying country-specific measures of structural progressivity over the 
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period 1981-2005.  In this regard, the study is different than most of the previous work, 
which has been country-specific and relied on micro-simulation exercises or computable 
general equilibrium models (Gravelle 1992; Martinez-Vazquez 2008).  We do 
acknowledge that macro analysis has certain limitations as we are not able to examine 
within country heterogeneity in individual responses or directly estimate the tax evasion 
effect on income inequality.  We also cannot account for the possible offsetting effects of 
other taxes.7  Nevertheless, macro data provide an exceptional opportunity for cross-
country comparisons in testing several important hypotheses. 
The key prediction of our theoretical framework is that progressivity affects 
observed inequality differently than it does true inequality, and that the difference 
between the two inequality effects is increasing with the extent of tax evasion and its 
responsiveness to tax changes.  To test this hypothesis, we use a country-level dataset of 
GINI coefficients calculated separately for gross income, net income, and consumption.  
We argue that the consumption-based measure of income is closer to true permanent 
income in comparison to disposable income reported in the household surveys.  We also 
develop and estimate comprehensive, time-varying measures of structural progressivity 
of national income tax systems by using complete national income tax schedules with 
statutory rates, thresholds, country-specific tax formulas and other information.  Our 
empirical analysis reveals that while progressivity reduces observed inequality in 
reported gross and net income, it has a significantly smaller impact on inequality in 
consumption.  We theorize that a positive effect of progressivity on true inequality is 
plausible, especially in the presence of weak legal institutions that can trigger a very large 
                                                 
7 In principle, policy makers could achieve the same level of income inequality by reducing the 
progressivity of the personal income taxes and increasing that of the corporate taxes. Alternatively, they 
could reduce the regressivity of the consumption taxes.   
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tax evasion response.  The evidence provides some support for our hypothesis as we 
show that weaker law and order produce the positive effect on inequality in consumption.  
As expected, we find that progressivity has a larger negative effect on net income 
inequality than on gross income inequality.  
This paper also contributes to the testing of two additional hypotheses.  One 
hypothesis is that an inverted U-shape relationship exists between income inequality and 
growth; the Kuznets hypothesis.  According to Kuznets (1955), this relationship is driven 
by changes that take place in the allocation of resources as the economy expands.  Our 
results are consistent with this hypothesis.  Another hypothesis, derived from the median 
voter theorem is that democracy and income inequality should be negatively related.  
While we do not test this hypothesis directly, we do show that progressivity tends to have 
a larger equalizing effect in societies that are more democratic.  We argue that this 
reinforcing effect works via larger redistribution which is brought about by the median 
voter in democratic societies.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I provide the theoretical framework.  This is 
followed by a description of the data, the empirical model, and the results.  The last 
section concludes.  
Theoretical Framework 
More progressive taxes are often designed to collect a greater share of income 
from the rich relative to the poor, thus reducing the inequality of disposable income 
relative to taxable income.  However, as the government increases structural 
progressivity or tax rates facing the rich, individuals may respond by taking steps to 
reduce their taxable income.  Reducing taxable income is achieved by either reducing 
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true income (productivity response) or simply reporting a smaller share of true income 
(tax evasion/avoidance response) and/or both.  While both behavioral responses are likely 
to reduce observed income inequality, they can have a differential effect on true income 
inequality.  That is, though we expect the productivity response from more progressive 
taxes to reduce true inequality, the evasion response may increase true disposable income 
of the rich (since no taxes are paid on the hidden income) and thus increase true 
inequality in net income.   
The existing estimates of the productivity response based on the labor supply 
elasticity with respect to tax changes are rather modest (Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir 
1998; Eissa and Liebman 1996).  However, they may well be understated as they do not 
account for other forms of productivity adjustment such as response in efforts, 
occupational mobility, job reallocation, etc.  Another common measure, the elasticity of 
taxable income, is not a suitable statistic to assess the productivity response as it also 
blends in the tax evasion response (Chetty 2009).  Recently, Gorodnichenko, Martinez-
Vazquez, and Sabirianova Peter (2009) (GMP henceforth) propose to use consumption 
data to measure the productivity response to tax changes; they find a relatively small 
growth in consumption of wealthier households that faced smaller tax rates after the 2001 
Russian flat rate income tax reform.  At the same time, they estimate a significant 
increase in reported income (5 to 10 times larger than the consumption increase net of 
windfall gains), attributing the difference to improved tax compliance of households in 
the upper tax brackets.  It has also been argued, in earlier studies, that the 
evasion/avoidance effect is much stronger in the upper tail of the income distribution 
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(Feldstein 1995; Slemrod 1994).  In other words, the rich tend to be more sensitive to 
changes in the tax rates because they are better able to hide their income.   
If the tax evasion response is indeed large, then the negative effect of higher and 
more progressive taxes on observed income inequality will significantly overstate (in 
absolute terms) their effect on true distribution.  Below we illustrate these possibilities 
more formally using both the Kuznets ratio and variance of log income as measures of 
inequality.  We first model the effect of tax progressivity on observed income inequality 
and then on true income inequality.  
We can show these results more formally by starting with a utility maximization 
problem that allows each person to choose the optimal amount of earned income and the 
amount of evasion.  These utility maximizing quantities should be functions of the tax 
rate and other parameters and should therefore give us an indication of the effect a 
change in tax rates will have on the distribution of income.  We assume that each 
individual’s utility function, )(),( yCyCU ψ−= , is concave, increasing in C, 
consumption, and decreasing in y, true income (Saez 2001),.8  As specified, the utility 
function imposes the assumption of strong separability which may be quite 
restrictive,(Cowell 1985).  However, we follow Chetty (2009)and Saez (2001) in writing 
the utility function this way; a more general model is derived in the appendix.  It is also 
assumed that each tax payer must make a choice about how much of earned income to 
evade.  This gamble is summarized by the probability of being caught, 10 ≤≤ ρ , and the 
                                                 
8I follow Chetty (2009) in specifying ψሺyሻ as the disutility of earning income, which is increasing in y.  A 
more general model that does not impose separability is derived in appendix A (section A1). 
 
12 
penalty structure, , where E is hidden income, t is the tax rate, F is the fine, 
and .  Therefore, consumption in the two states can be summarized as follows: 
)(EFtE +
( )E
1C
0/ >F
( )yt−= 1
( )yt−= 1
2C
tEC +1          1 
FC −2          2 
where  is equal to   minus the penalty.  Consumption is  in state one where the 
probability of not being caught is 
1C
( )ρ−1 , and  in state two where the probability of 
being caught is 
2C
ρ .  The individual maximizes expected utility by choosing y, income, 
and E, hidden income to solve the following; 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )yEFtEytMax +−= 11
0,0 ≥≥ yE
ψρρ −−−EU  
subject to   
Differentiating with respect to y and E yields 
( ) ( ) 0/ ≤y1−=
y
EU −∂
∂ t ψ
        3
 
( ) ( ) 0/ ≤EFρ
)
1−=
E
( )t /ψ=
( )t ρρ =
−∂
∂ tEU ρ
)
        4
 
Assuming we have values that satisfy interior solutions, we can write eq. (3) and (4) as  
(y1−           5 
(EF /1−          6 
Equations (5) and (6) implicitly define the equilibrium level of earnings and 
hidden income as functions of the parameters of the model.  From eq. (5) we observe that 
the individual will increase income until the expected marginal disutility from income is 
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equal to the marginal benefit of income.  The marginal benefit from income is the net of 
tax expected change in utility that result from the change in y.  Similarly, the optimal 
amount of hidden income is that amount which sets the expected marginal benefit of 
evasion equal to the expected marginal cost of evasion.  These equations can be solved 
for y and E if a specific utility function is assumed.  The expressions for y and E can then 
be used to construct measures of income inequality that can be used to determine the 
effect of taxes on the distribution of income.   
Inequality in Observed Income 
In this subsection, we use two inequality indices that demonstrate the effect of 
structural progressivity on observed income inequality.  Suppose we have two groups of 
individuals: r=rich and p=poor.  Let ܫ௬଴ be observed income inequality in disposable 
income between rich and poor, measured as the Kuznets ratio, which is the ratio of 
income received by the rich relative to that received by the poor.  We can write the 
Kuznets measure of observed inequality in disposable income as:  
( )( ) ( )orrpop r
o
r
o
p
o
ro
y YttY
tY
Gy
yI θ+−
−=+= 1
1
       7
  
where Yo is observed gross earned income reported for tax purposes, y0 is observed 
earned income net of tax, t is the average tax rate, and G is non-taxable government 
transfers.  For simplicity of exposition, we assume that transfers are exclusively from rich 
to poor, and that they comprise a fixed portion θ of revenues collected from rich.  
Equation (7) allows redistribution to be either pro-poor (0<θ<1) or neutral (θ=0).  We 
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also note that observed gross income can be written as the difference between the true 
income Y* and hidden income E;  for rich and  for poor. rr
o
r EYY −= * ppop EYY −= *
 Holding the tax rate facing the poor constant, tr becomes an indicator of structural 
tax progressivity.  Changes in structural progressivity create behavioral responses among 
the rich – a likely negative productivity effect 0
*
<∂
∂
r
r
t
Y  and a positive tax evasion effect
0>∂
∂
r
r
t
E .  These assumptions follow from the earlier discussion.  Furthermore, since the 
average tax rate facing the poor doesn’t change, we assume no behavioral response for 
the poor.9   
As illustrated below, 
r
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 is unambiguously negative under these assumptions.  
[ ] ( ) ( )
( )2
11
Gopy
o
rY
r
o
rY
rr
o
rY
o
rYr
r
o
rYGopy
r
o
yI
+
+∂
∂−−−−∂
∂+
=∂
∂ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
τττθττ
τ
   8
 
( ) ( )
( )2
2
1
Gopy
o
rY
o
rYr
r
o
rYo
py
+
−−−∂
∂
=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ θττ
 
( ) ( ) ,0
2
2
1
*
1
0
0 0 
0 
<
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−∂
∂−−∂
∂−+−=
<
<<
<
443421
443442143421321
ttion effecredistribu
effectevasioneffecttyproductivi
effectdirect G
o
py
o
rY
r
rE
rA
r
rY
rA
o
rAY
θ
ττττ
   9
 
                                                 
9 In reality, a small negative productivity effect might exist for the poor because of the positive income 
effect from government transfers which reduces work incentives. 
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where 2
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +
=
Gopy
o
pyA .  The first term in eq. (9) shows the direct effect of tax 
progressivity on income inequality in the absence of behavioral responses and subsequent 
redistribution from rich to poor.  The negative direct effect arises simply from the fact 
that a progressive tax structure imposes a relatively higher tax burden on the rich. 
Equation (9) hints that the response of true and observed inequality to tax changes 
is likely to be different.  Because the rich have greater access to the various means of 
hiding their income, they report a relatively smaller share of their income as structural 
progressivity increases, which give the false impression that the distribution of income is 
becoming more equal.  As shown below, however, the distribution of true income may 
not improve. 
The last term in eq. (9) shows the negative redistribution effect.  If the 
government succeeds in redistributing the collected revenues in a pro-poor or neutral 
manner, then the higher taxes on the rich are likely to reduce observed income inequality, 
ceteris paribus.  On the other hand, if redistribution is pro-rich, then the effect of 
structural progressivity on observed income inequality becomes ambiguous.   
Thus, the negative direct effect of higher tax progressivity on observed income 
inequality is reinforced by the negative productivity response, the positive tax evasion 
response, and pro-poor redistribution.  Consequently, we formulate two hypotheses that 
can be tested with macro data:  
Hypothesis 1 The statistical relationship between tax progressivity and income 
inequality as measured by observed, reported income is likely to be negative. 
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Hypothesis 2 Factors that are positively associated with pro-poor redistribution such as 
democracy and civil liberties (Meltzer and Richard 1983) are likely to reinforce the 
negative effect of structural tax progressivity on observed income inequality. 
Similar to the Kuznets ratio explored above, the effect of taxes on the distribution 
of income can be obtained by differentiating the variance of log net income index with 
respect to taxes.  We write the variance of log net income as10. 
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1
log1~log )  is the mean of log income.  Totally differentiating eq. (10) with 
respect to ti yields the following.11 
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1
1
1~loglog
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i
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ii μyA π
τ , *
i
i
i Y
E=π , and 
j
t
t
j
j ∂
∂=ε  is the elasticity of j (evasion or 
income) with respect to taxes.   
It is clear from eq. (12) that the net effect of taxes on inequality depends on the 
sum of its effect on the various parts of the income distribution.  While the sign of the 
                                                 
10 Since y and E are derived from the maximization problem they are functions of the tax rate, and the other 
parameters specified in that problem.  Note also, that we ignore transfers for this exercise.  They can be 
easily included; see appendix A. 
 
11We are assuming that individual i’s tax rate does not affect individual k’s behavior.   
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term in square brackets is likely to be negative for everyone (as discussed in more detail 
later), the sign of the first term varies along the income distribution.  It is negative for 
those earning less than mean income and positive for those earning more than mean 
income.  Therefore, reducing the tax rate on individuals above mean income should 
increase income inequality, while reducing taxes on those below mean income should 
reduce inequality.  The net effect will depend on which of these two effects dominates.12  
This finding is consistent with the previous literature.  In particular, it is commonly 
known that the impact of any tax reform on the distribution of income depends on the 
existing income distribution (Fuest, Peichl, and Schaefer 2008; Poterba 2007).   
Equation (12) also shows that taxes affect inequality through direct and indirect 
channels.  The direct effect is captured by the term ( )iπ−1  while the tax-induced indirect 
effects are captured by ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
i
i
Eiiyi τ
τεπε 1 , which includes both the productivity effect,
yiε  and the evasion effect, Eiεπ .  Now, to see the distributional impact of a tax reform, 
let us assume that dti =0 for everyone below mean income, dti <0 for those above mean 
income, 0<yiε , and 0>Eε .13  Under these assumptions, all three channels contribute to 
an unambiguous increase in observed net income inequality.  This result is due to the fact 
that both the evasion and productivity responses lead to a relative increase in reported 
gross income for the rich, which in turn leads to an increase in observed net income 
inequality.  The direct effect is also straightforward; the lower rates on the rich reduce 
                                                 
12 Obviously, if a tax reform involves reducing top rates only, the change in inequality will be positive.  
This assumes that the top rate applies only to individuals whose income is above the mean. 
 
13We make these assumptions to simplify the discussion.  Note that Ai is positive for these individuals.  
Besides convenience, these assumptions are similar to the changes made via the tax reform that we analyze 
in the empirical section.   
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their tax burden relative to the tax burden facing the poor thus resulting in an increase in 
net income inequality. 
Inequality in True Income 
We now turn our attention to true income inequality.  Using the above notations, 
we define true income inequality  as the ratio of actual disposable income received by 
the rich relative to that received by the poor: 
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We again assume that redistribution is pro-poor (0<θ<1).  Given that true income 
is the sum of reported income and hidden income, i.e., , we can obtain the 
following partial effect of structural progressivity on true income inequality, holding tax 
rates of the poor  and redistribution policy 
r
o
rr EYY +=*
pt θ  constant. 
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where 0>Etε  and 0* >tε  is the elasticity of evasion and true income with respect to tax 
changes, respectively. 
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Equation (16) demonstrates that the effect of tax progressivity on true income 
inequality is ambiguous.  Higher taxes on the rich could increase actual income inequality 
if the share of hidden income among the rich is large while the elasticity of true 
income/productivity is small relative to the elasticity of hidden income.  For example, 
GMP find a large positive tax compliance response but small productivity/consumption 
response of affluent households to Russia’s 2001 flat rate personal income tax reform.  
Thus, in countries like Russia, inequality might possibly decline from lowering upper tax 
rates.   
While we do not observe true income in a typical household survey, we agree 
with GMP that expenditures or consumption are more difficult to hide, and are therefore 
much closer to true permanent income than is reported income.  The testable implication 
is that in the presence of a positive tax evasion response, an increase in structural 
progressivity should bring a more sizeable reduction in observed income inequality than 
in consumption inequality.  A positive effect on consumption inequality is also possible.   
Another important implication of eq. (16) is that the difference between the effect 
of tax changes on consumption inequality and their effect on observed income inequality 
is expected to increase with the extent of tax evasion.  Assuming that the weakness of 
legal institutions is positively correlated with the share of hidden income, we may 
anticipate that a positive effect of structural progressivity on consumption inequality is 
more likely to be found in countries with weaker legal institutions.  
Consequently, we can postulate two additional testable hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 3 The effect of structural progressivity on inequality in consumption is likely 
to be smaller than the effect of structural progressivity on inequality in observed net 
income.  A positive effect on consumption inequality is possible. 
Hypothesis 4 The positive effect of structural progressivity on consumption inequality is 
more likely to be found in countries with weaker legal institutions. 
Similar conclusions are reached using the variance of log income to assess the 
impact of changes in progressivity on income inequality.  To see this, first write true net 
income as  
( ) iiiii EtYty +−= ** 1          17 
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While the sign of the first term, ( )( )μyi ~loglog * −
dt
, varies along the income 
distribution as in the previous section, the sign of the last term is now ambiguous.  
Therefore, it is possible for a reduction in the tax rate, for example, to reduce inequality.  
This possibility is greatest when evasion is widespread and is very responsive (positively) 
to the tax rate.  To see this, we order individuals according to income from lowest to 
highest.  Let n1 individuals have income lower than mean income and N-n1 individuals 
have income above mean income.  Now, suppose that  is negative for all i [ ]Nni ,11 +∈  
and zero for all .  This implies that eq. (18) can be rewritten as  [ 1,1 ni∈ ]
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which is negative if the evasion effect is positive and larger than the other two terms in 
the square bracket.  That is, reducing the tax rate reduces income inequality.  The 
implication of this result is that the shift to flatter personal income tax schedules that has 
taken place over the last two decades may have led to an improvement in the distribution 
of actual net income in countries where the “right” conditions exist.  As such, we can 
derive similar hypotheses to those derived using the Kuznet Ratio. 
The theoretical discussion above tells a compelling story about the possible 
distributional impact of tax reforms and how such effects should be evaluated.  In 
particular, it points to the need to distinguish between direct and indirect effects by 
acknowledging the role played by behavioral responses, and between actual and observed 
net income inequality by acknowledging the role played by evasion.  Ignoring these 
distinctions can lead to seriously misguided policy prescriptions.  For example, whereas a 
reduction in tax rates can be expected to increase observed net income inequality, it can 
also reduce actual net income inequality.  Similarly, the evasion response is shown to 
affect observed net income inequality differently than it does actual net income 
inequality; the evasion effect leads to increased observed inequality but may lower true 
inequality, ceteris paribus.  An empirical analysis is therefore required to identify the sign 
and size of the various channels discussed above.   
Measuring Inequality and Structural Progressivity 
Income Inequality Measure 
We test the hypotheses developed in the previous section using country-level 
GINI coefficients obtained from the World Institute for Development Research (WIDER 
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v.2b), the International Labor Office LABORSTA, and European Commission 
EUROSTAT.  Altogether these sources provide us with 3512 GINI estimates from 1981 
to 2005.  For the purpose of our analysis, we selected all GINI coefficients that are based 
on one of the three income definitions: gross income, disposable (net) income, and 
expenditures or consumption.  The selected GINIs were grouped into 3 categories of area 
coverage (national, urban or national with exclusions, and other), 4 categories of income 
adjustment (equivalence scale, per capita adjustment, no adjustment, and unknown), and 
4 categories of data quality rating.14  We then averaged multiple GINI measures by 
country, year, income base, area coverage, income adjustment, and quality rating.  
Finally, for a given country, year, and income base, we selected one average measure 
using the following set of preferences: national estimates are preferred to urban, rural and 
other area coverage estimates, equivalence scales or per capita adjustment are chosen 
over no or unknown adjustment, and higher quality GINIs are preferred to those with 
lower quality.   
This selection process left us with 1683 GINI estimates for 143 countries from 
1981 to 2005.15  The majority of the estimates meet the best practices as set out by the 
WIDER.  Appendix Table B 1 shows that 93 percent of the GINI estimates have national 
coverage, 75 percent have been adjusted for the household size, and 71 percent have a 
good quality rating, 1 or 2.  Also, the distribution across income base is suited for the 
type of analysis that we carry out in the paper.  More specifically, of the total sample of 
                                                 
14 The data quality rating is designed by the WIDER.  It ranges from 1 to 4, where 1 denotes observations 
with a sufficient quality of the income concept and the survey.  As to other data sources, we assigned 1 to 
Eurostat data and 2 to ILO estimates. 
 
15 The sample includes only countries that were independent in a corresponding year.  To avoid double 
counting, we excluded GINIs for the parts of the former unified countries like USSR or Yugoslavia prior to 
their breakup. 
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GINI estimates, 20 percent are based on consumption, 34 percent on gross income, and 
46 percent on net income.  To control for differences in GINI measurement, our estimates 
include dummy variables for income base, area coverage, and income adjustment 
categories.  While we recognize that the use of dummy variables does not eliminate all of 
the biases resulting from comparability issues (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001), we are 
constrained by existing inequality estimates.  This is especially restricting in cross-
country panel studies due to variations in the quality of primary data sources, differences 
in definition of variables and other procedures followed by individual countries. 
In an effort to identify the trend in income inequality over time, we regress the 
GINI coefficients on a quadratic time trend, controlling for income base, area coverage, 
income adjustment, and country classification.16  The coefficients on the time terms are 
then used to plot the average GINI trend in Figure 1.  The results indicate that income 
inequality increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s before declining during the 2000–
2005 period.  Figure 1 also reports the time trend weighted by a country’s GDP in 
constant U.S. dollars and population.17  While the GDP–weighted trend follows that of 
the unweighted, the population–weighted trend shows income inequality increasing 
throughout the sample period, which is consistent with rising inequality in China, India, 
and other developing countries with large populations. 
                                                 
16 A similar, though not identical, procedure is used by Easterly (2007) to address the consistency problem 
inherent in the GINI data.  Country categories are defined using the World Bank country classification 
based on historical (time-varying) income thresholds.  For example, the income thresholds used for the 
2005 classification are as follows: low income, $875 or less, lower middle income, $876-$3465, upper 
middle income, $3466-$10725, and high income, $10725 or more. 
 
17 We suspect that population may be the better of the two weights since inequality is essentially an 
individual concept. 
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Table 1 provides additional summary statistics on the GINI coefficient by income 
definition across time.  However, one has to be careful in interpreting these numbers 
because of comparability issues.  In particular, the income–based and expenditure–based 
measures cannot be compared without a regression framework because the latter 
oversamples low and lower middle income countries while the former oversamples high 
and upper middle income countries (see Figure B 1).  Bearing in mind this important 
caveat, the table shows that the consumption–based GINI follows the unweighted trend 
in Figure 1; increasing from a low of 36 in the early 1980s to a high of 41 in the early 
1990s before declining to a low of 35 in the last period of the sample.  From Figure B 1, 
we can conclude that this pattern of change is driven primarily by low and lower middle 
income countries.  Based on the income measures, we observe that gross (net) income 
inequality increased from 37(30) in the early 1980s to 43(36) in mid 1990s before falling 
back to 40(31) in the last period.  We also observe that gross income is most unequally 
distributed followed by consumption and net income.  These patterns are consistent with 
the literature (Easterly 2007). 
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Figure 1. Global Trend in Income Inequality, 1981-2005 
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Table 1. Average GINI by Income Base and Period 
Income Base 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 
Consumption 36.250 37.180 41.390 37.606 34.954 
 (6.137) (8.994) (10.795) (8.132) (6.837) 
 [21] [54] [98] [124] [40] 
Gross income 37.469 39.420 42.934 42.327 40.150 
 (11.132) (12.074) (12.484) (10.151) (8.082) 
 [96] [109] [162] [150] [62] 
Net income 29.889 33.664 34.824 35.713 30.979 
 (8.604) (11.245) (10.406) (10.922) (6.285) 
 [84] [113] [169] [242] [159] 
Total 34.174 36.625 39.387 38.090 33.766 
 (10.331) (11.450) (11.892) (10.458) (7.812) 
 [201] [276] [429] [516] [261] 
Notes: Number of GINI observations is 1683; number of country-year observations is 1229.  
Standard deviation is in parentheses and number of GINI observations is in brackets.  
 
 
Tax Progressivity Measures 
In contrast to income inequality, the measures of tax progressivity are not readily 
available for cross-country comparison.  The existing measures implemented in the 
literature fall into one of three groups: (1) the top statutory PIT rate, (2) effective 
inequality-based measures of progressivity, and (3) structural progressivity measures.  In 
their original form, none of these measures are perfectly suitable for our analysis. 
The top statutory PIT rate is a legally determined marginal tax rate applicable to 
the top bracket of the income tax schedule.  Although this tax rate has occasionally been 
used in empirical cross-country research as a proxy variable for tax progressivity, it might 
be a misleading indicator of progressivity since both proportional and highly progressive 
tax systems may, in principle, have the same top statutory rate.  In reality, however, there 
is a high (about 0.5) correlation between the top rate and other progressivity measures 
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that will be introduced below.  For that reason, we do not discard this variable and will 
employ it in some specifications. 
The effective progressivity is based on some indicator of income inequality.  In its 
simplest form, effective progressivity is the ratio of after-tax GINI to before-tax GINI and 
“measures the extent to which a given tax structure results in a shift in the distribution of 
income toward equality” (Musgrave and Thin 1948).  More sophisticated measures have 
been proposed by Kakwani, (1977) Suits (1977), and others.  The inequality-based 
measures generally require information on pre-tax and post-tax inequality and the 
distribution of the tax burden.  Information on these variables is either not available or 
not comparable across countries.  The more serious problem, though, is the issue of 
simultaneity in determination of income inequality and inequality-based progressivity, 
which inhibits the identification of the direct effect of tax progressivity on inequality. 
From this perspective, the measures of structural progressivity are more suitable 
for the purpose of our analysis.  The term “structural progressivity” was introduced by 
Musgrave and Thin (1948) to denote changes in average and marginal rates along the 
income distribution.  These changes can be identified without knowing after-tax 
inequality, making the endogeneity problem less severe.  However, the calculations 
require information on gross income distribution, which is difficult to gather in a 
comparable way at the cross-country level.  Another issue is which measure to choose 
since structural progressivity changes along the income distribution. 
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Ideally we need a single, comprehensive measure of PIT progressivity, which is 
comparable across countries, available for a large representative sample of countries, and 
vary over time.  We propose the following procedure to derive such a measure. 
The first step in calculating structural progressivity is to obtain average and 
marginal tax rates at different points of the income distribution.  Instead of actual income 
distribution, we use a country’s GDP per capita and its multiples as a comparable income 
base.  The GDP figures are rescaled to get 100 units of pre-tax income for each country 
and year, ranging from 4 percent to 400 percent of a country’s GDP per capita.  We then 
apply the tax schedule information to these units of income to obtain tax liability and 
average and marginal tax rates.  The data on national tax schedules is collected for 189 
countries from 1981 to 2005 and described in detail in Sabirianova Peter, Buttrick, and 
Duncan (2010).  Here we just note that our average and marginal tax rates take into 
account standard deductions, basic personal allowances, tax credits, local taxes, major 
national surtaxes, multiple schedules, non-standard tax formulas, and other provisions in 
addition to statutory rates and thresholds. 
The progressivity measures are obtained by regressing marginal (or average) rates 
on gross income using 100 data points that are formed around a country’s GDP per capita 
in a given year.  The slope coefficient on the income variable measures the percentage 
point change in the tax rate resulting from a one percentage point change in pre-tax 
income18 and is our measure of structural progressivity.  The PIT structure is interpreted 
as progressive, proportional or regressive if the slope coefficient is positive, zero or 
negative, respectively.  This procedure gives us marginal rate progression (MRP1) and 
                                                 
18 Pre-tax income is measured in percentage points relative to a country’s GDP per capita. 
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average rate progression (ARP1) for each country and year in our dataset.  Figure 2 
illustrates how the MRP1 is obtained for a hypothetical case with no allowances and 
other provisions.  
It should be noted that structural progressivity can deviate significantly from the 
nominal progressivity of the legal tax scale.  This is especially pertinent to low income 
countries, where taxable income of the majority of population is often below the first tax 
threshold.  Based on our procedure, countries for which a significant proportion of the 
population does not pay taxes will have progressivity measures of zero or close to zero.  
This makes sense, since the tax structure is effectively proportional when no one is 
paying taxes, even if the statutory rate schedule is highly graduated. 
To obtain a single, comprehensive measure we had to impose a linearity 
restriction on the relationship between rates and income levels.  Given that the nominal 
tax schedule has a top statutory marginal rate, both the average and marginal rate 
progression measures, as defined by Musgrave and Thin , decline as one move up the 
income distribution.  In other words, the tax schedule is less progressive at the top of the 
income scale.  In an effort to capture this nonlinearity, we also calculated MRP2 and 
ARP2 for the bottom portion of the income scale up to 200 percent of a country’s GDP 
per capita.  Figure 2 illustrates MRP2 for a hypothetical case 
.
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Figure 2. Marginal Rate Progression: Illustrative Example 
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Notes:  Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical schedule of marginal rates (MR), with top statutory PIT 
rate 50 percent and no deductions and tax credits.  Marginal rate progression (MRP) is the 
estimated slope coefficient from regressing marginal rates on gross income (as percent of GDP per 
capita).  MRP1 is calculated for gross income from 4 percent to 400 percent of y, MRP2 is 
calculated for gross income from 4 percent to 200 percent of y, where y is a country’s GDP per 
capita.  
 
 
Table 2 reports summary statistics on four progressivity measures across time.  To 
infer the global trend, mean values are weighted by a country’s share in world GDP and 
world population.  The pattern that stands out is that all of the measures declined 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s and then remained stable during the latter period, 
with the exception of ARP2 that declined steadily over the whole period.  In concordance 
with the non-linear properties of progressivity (Musgrave and Thin 1948), our measures 
calculated for the bottom portion of the income scale tend to be larger than those for the 
full income scale, and the ARP measures are smaller than their corresponding MRP 
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measures.  Table 2 also reports summary statistics on the top statutory PIT rate.  The top 
marginal tax rate has declined steadily from a high of 56 percent in the 1981–1985 period 
to a low of 37 percent in the 2001–2005 period.  Since these global trends follow closely 
those reported in Sabirianova Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan (2010), we refer the reader to 
that paper for a more detailed description of the changes that have taken place over the 
last 25 years. 
 
 
Table 2. Structural PIT Progressivity by Period 
Progressivity 
measure 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 Total 
Top PIT Rate 56.144 48.294 42.085 39.984 36.772 44.479 
(12.717) (13.153) (11.053) (9.959) (9.482) (13.216) 
[553] [585] [702] [793] [826] [3459] 
MRP1 0.069 0.059 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.061 
(0.052) (0.046) (0.038) (0.030) (0.028) (0.040) 
MRP2 0.114 0.105 0.089 0.092 0.091 0.098 
(0.094) (0.083) (0.072) (0.070) (0.067) (0.078) 
ARP1 0.054 0.048 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.045 
(0.043) (0.037) (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.034) 
ARP2 0.083 0.076 0.064 0.063 0.058 0.068 
(0.073) (0.061) (0.055) (0.054) (0.050) (0.059) 
[449] [502] [603] [711] [715] [2980] 
Notes:  Standard deviation is in parentheses and number of country-year observations is in brackets.  
MRP1 and ARP1 is marginal and average tax rate progressions up to an income level equivalent to four 
times a country’s GDP per capita; MRP2 and ARP2 is marginal and average tax rate progressions for the 
levels of income up to 2⋅y, where y is a country’s GDP per capita. 
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Empirical Methodology 
The OLS Model for Observed Income Inequality 
Following the theoretical model discussed above, we write observed income 
inequality as a function of structural progressivity and other control variables: 
itititittit WZPI εφδβξ ++++=        20 
where Iit is observed inequality measured by income-based GINI coefficients (either net 
or gross income) in country i and year t, tξ  captures year effects, Pit is the relevant 
measure of PIT progressivity, Zit is a vector of control variables, and Wit is a vector of 
auxiliary variables that are included to control for consistency of the GINI coefficients (a 
dummy for national area coverage, a set of dummies for the type of income adjustment, 
and a dummy to indicate the type of income base (gross or net income), and εit is the error 
term.  The Z vector includes the one-year lagged log of GDP per capita in quadratic form, 
the rate of inflation, the share of services in GDP, and the share of industry in GDP (see 
Appendix Table B 2 for variable definitions).  The quadratic form of GDP per capita is 
used to account for the existence of the Kuznets Curve which postulates that there is a 
non-linear (inverted U) relationship between income inequality and per capita GDP.  If it 
exists, we expect a positive coefficient on the linear term and a negative coefficient on 
the quadratic term.  The coefficient of interest, β , captures the effect of progressivity on 
inequality in observed income, and is expected to be negative. 
The OLS results reported in Table 3 and Table 4 by and large confirm these 
expectations.  A one percentage point increase in the top statutory PIT rate reduces the 
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GINI by 0.08 points, ceteris paribus.19  Inequality in gross income is predictably higher 
than inequality in net income.  The sign of the coefficients on both GDP terms is 
consistent with the Kuznets hypothesis.  Table 4 includes the same set of covariates as 
in Table 3, except for the top statutory PIT rate, which is replaced with one of the 
measures of structural progressivity.  All of the progressivity measures have a statistically 
significant negative effect on income inequality.  However, the magnitude of the 
marginal effects is small.  A 100 percent increase in any progressivity measure reduces 
the GINI coefficient by less than 20 percent at the mean.  For example, a twofold increase 
in the MRP1 slope from 0.062 (mean) to 0.124 is estimated to reduce the GINI 
coefficient by 1.57 (=25.317*0.062); not such a large effect given that the sample mean 
of GINI coefficients for net and gross income is 37.   
 
 
19 The GINI is measured on a scale from 0 to 100. 
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Table 3. Base Specification for Inequality in Observed Income 
 OLS IV (a) IV (b) Mean (Std.dev.) 
Top PIT Rate -0.080*** -0.639*** -1.613*** 39.666 
 (0.017) (0.102) (0.226) (14.160) 
Log (GDP per capita)t-1 6.017* 16.251*** 29.664*** 8.480 
 (3.354) (4.648) (8.361) (1.453) 
Log (GDP per capita)t-1 squared -0.531*** -1.081*** -1.794*** 74.013 
 (0.187) (0.261) (0.477) (24.075) 
Service, % GDP 0.193*** -0.058 -0.412*** 57.437 
 (0.061) (0.083) (0.155) (12.428) 
Industry, % GDP -0.244*** -0.335*** -0.339** 32.921 
 (0.068) (0.088) (0.158) (7.705) 
Inflation  0.001 0.001 -0.001 60.815 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (316.894) 
GINI based on gross income  7.041*** 6.904*** 6.985*** 0.414 
(dummy) (0.634) (0.909) (1.667)  
National coverage (dummy) -0.526 3.006* 9.348*** 0.926 
 (0.899) (1.568) (3.311)  
Income adjustment      
Equivalence scale -0.993 2.869** 9.894*** 0.318 
 (0.674) (1.335) (2.910)  
Per capita adjustment 6.286*** 7.304*** 8.051*** 0.388 
 (0.684) (0.995) (1.923)  
Unknown adjustment -0.891 0.967 2.739 0.024       
 (1.278) (1.936) (3.342)  
N (observations) 1252 1116 1100 1252 
R-squared 0.44 … … … 
Wild chi2 … 533.040*** 174.070*** … 
Sargan-Hansen J statistic … just identified 1.053 … 
Sargan-Hansen p-value … … 0.305 … 
F-test of excluded IVs … 72.750*** 27.580*** … 
Partial R2 of excluded IVs … 0.074 0.044 … 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  The dependent variable is GINI in gross or net income.  Year dummies are included in 
all three models but not shown here.  Instrument in (a) is the distance-population weighted top PIT rate in 
bordering countries.  Instruments in (b) are distance-population weighted MRP1 and marginal rate at 
income 4⋅y in neighboring countries, where y is a country’s GDP per capita.  The omitted category for 
income adjustment is “no adjustment” 
. 
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Table 4. Structural Progressivity and Inequality in Observed Income 
 Progressivity Measures 
 MRP1 MRP2 ARP1 ARP2 
Mean (std.dev.) 0.062 0.122 0.055 0.093 
 (0.035) (0.082) (0.033) (0.065) 
OLS 
Progressivity -25.317** -35.219*** -113.219*** -61.466*** 
 (10.004) (4.489) (11.281) (5.015) 
N (observations) 1117 1117 1117 1120 
R-squared 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.53 
     
IV (a):  IV = Weighted top PIT rate in bordering countries 
Progressivity -368.334*** -266.514*** -394.222*** -183.006*** 
 (54.700) (53.099) (52.352) (25.252) 
N (observations) 983 983 983 986 
F-test of excluded IV 74.876*** 23.925*** 74.222*** 64.133*** 
Partial R2 of excluded IV 0.065 0.026 0.074 0.062 
     
IV (b) 
Progressivity -579.635*** -212.371*** -392.518*** -173.406*** 
 (68.177) (19.870) (27.781) (11.958) 
N (observations) 970 970 970 973 
IVs W_MRP1 & 
W_MR at 4y 
W_ARP2 & 
W_MR at 2y 
W_ARP1 & 
W_AR at 4y 
W_ARP2 & 
W_AR at 3y 
F-test of excluded IVs 41.419*** 61.930*** 148.927*** 170.325*** 
Partial R2 of excluded IVs 0.089 0.139 0.286 0.277 
Sargan-Hansen J statistic 1.120 1.841 0.905 0.689 
Sargan-Hansen p-value 0.290 0.175 0.342 0.407 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  The dependent variable is GINI in gross or net income.  Estimation is done for each 
progressivity measure separately.  Each specification includes the same set of covariates as in Table 3, 
however, only the variable of interest is reported above.  Prefix “W_” denotes distance-population 
weighted average of the corresponding measure in bordering countries.  MRP1 and ARP1 is marginal and 
average tax rate progressions for income up to 4⋅y; MRP2 and ARP2 is marginal and average tax rate 
progressions for income up to 2⋅y, where y is a country’s GDP per capita. 
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The IV Model for Observed Income Inequality 
Despite the promising start, there are several reasons to believe that the OLS 
results reported in the previous section might be biased and inconsistent.  For example, 
the ideal estimating procedure would be to use country fixed effects to account for 
heterogeneity among countries.  However, the use of fixed effects is problematic given 
the limited within variation in the dependent variable for some countries.  The GINI data 
are mostly sparse for a number of the countries in our sample.20  To the extent that 
constant country characteristics are correlated with the error term, omitted fixed effects 
create an endogeneity bias. 
Another form of endogeneity bias stems from the fact that structural progressivity 
by itself is an estimated parameter with associated standard errors.  This can lead to an 
attenuation bias in the estimated effects, assuming that standard errors follow the 
properties of the classical error-in-variables problem.  
Finally, an endogeneity bias may arise from reverse causality.  The political 
economy literature has long established a reverse relationship between income inequality 
and taxes (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Persson and Tabellini 2002).  Also, much of the 
empirical work that examines the effect of income inequality on economic growth argues 
that inequality affects growth through its effect on taxes and redistribution,(Barro 2000; 
Milanovic 2000; Perotti 1992; Persson and Tabellini 1994).  The general argument, based 
on the median voter hypothesis, is that as the ratio of median income to mean income 
falls (i.e., inequality increases), the median voter will vote for higher taxes and greater 
                                                 
20 Some countries either have one income base or they have both but only for some years.  Furthermore, 
there are a number of countries for which GINI data is only available for few years.   
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redistribution.  Therefore, greater income inequality should lead to greater progressivity.  
This reverse causality implies that the OLS estimates of β are likely to be biased 
upwards. 
Therefore, all three sources of endogeneity (omitted variables, measurement error, 
and reverse causality) could bias the estimated effects of progressivity on observed 
income inequality.  To account for the endogeneity of our progressivity measures, we 
rely on the tax competition models to create instrumental variables using the 
corresponding tax variables from neighboring countries.  Theoretically, we expect that 
tax variables in country A will be correlated with tax variables in bordering country B, as 
countries compete for the tax base, but will only affect country B’s level of inequality via 
this correlation.  As such, we create instruments for each progressivity measure using 
distance-population weighted averages of tax/progressivity measures in neighboring 
countries (Sabirianova Peter 2008 ).  The choice of weights used is driven by the need to 
account for both the ease with which individuals can travel from country A to country B 
(distance from A’s capital to B’s capital) and the volume of the potential flow 
(population).  Since the tax rates in country A do not have an independent effect on 
income inequality in country B, we expect that our instruments will be uncorrelated with 
the error term in eq. (20). 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 report 2SLS estimates of β using average top PIT rate 
in bordering countries, IV(a), and average MRP1 and marginal rate at the level of income 
equivalent to four times GDP per capita in bordering countries, IV(b); all instrumental 
variables are weighted by distance and population.  The F-statistic for excluded 
instruments rejects the null that the instruments have no explanatory power in the first 
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stage.  Since we use two instruments in column 3, we are able to implement the Sargan-
Hansen overidentification test.  The large p-values reported in Table 3 mean that we 
cannot reject the null that the orthogonality conditions for the instruments are satisfied.   
Both IV results are qualitatively similar to the OLS results presented in column 1.  
The most obvious difference, though, is that the IV estimates are much larger, indicating 
that endogeneity is a serious problem.  An increase in the top PIT rate by one percentage 
point now reduces the GINI coefficient by 0.64 points, when one instrument is used and 
by 1.61 points when two instrumental variables are used.  Also interesting is the 
significance of the Kuznets curve in both IV specifications.   
A similar pattern of results is observed in Table 4 where the results of our primary 
progressivity measures are reported.  The instrument used in IV(a) is the average top 
statutory PIT rate in bordering countries.  In IV(b), MRP1 is instrumented by weighted 
MRP1 and marginal tax rate at income equivalent to 4⋅GDP per capita; other 
progressivity measures are instrumented similarly using one progressivity slope and one 
tax rate from neighboring countries.  All instruments are weighted by distance and 
population.  The choice of instruments is supported by the statistical validity tests, 
including the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentification.   
All progressivity measures are estimated to have a negative and statistically 
significant effect on observed income inequality.  Furthermore, unlike the OLS results, 
the effect on income inequality is large in magnitude.  Increasing ARP1 by 0.01 (or 20 
percent increase at the mean), for example, reduces the GINI coefficient by 3.9 points or 
about 10 percent.  These results all point to the significant role played by progressive 
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taxes in the redistribution of observed, reported income.  The effect of progressivity on 
true income inequality remains undetermined. 
The Role of Democratic Institutions in Observed Income Inequality 
The effect of progressivity on observed income inequality, though shown to be 
unambiguously negative, may be affected by the redistribution policy of the government.  
Pro-rich redistribution in the presence of rising progressivity may cause the estimated 
effect of progressivity to be smaller than it actually is (in absolute value).  We therefore 
expect that economic environments that are conducive to pro-poor redistribution will 
have a greater progressivity effect.  In particular, pro-poor policies are more likely to be 
implemented in countries with stronger democratic institutions that give people a voice in 
their political and economic governance to ensure liberty and equality.  Theoretical 
arguments for the positive relationship between democracy and pro-poor redistribution 
come from the median voter hypothesis.  According to this hypothesis, the median voter 
votes for higher tax progressivity and greater redistribution to the poor as income 
inequality rises (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Persson and Tabellini 2002).  Since the 
ability to vote requires some kind of democratic process, the median voter hypothesis 
implies that there is a positive link between democracy and pro-poor redistribution.  In 
other words, the more democratic the political process, the more likely it is that the 
median voter will have some influence over policy making.  In particular, to the extent 
that income is distributed unequally, having a more democratic political process should 
be positively correlated with pro-poor redistribution (Gradstein, Milanovic, and Ying 
2001). 
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Given the theoretical result in eq. (9) and our second hypothesis, we expect that 
stronger democratic institutions, indicating greater likelihood of pro-poor redistribution, 
should reinforce the negative inequality effect of progressivity.  In order to test this 
hypothesis, we extend the baseline eq. (20) to include an interaction term between the 
progressivity measures and democratic indicators.  Given the above discussion, we 
expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be negative.   
The democratic indicators include two Freedom House 7-point country ratings of 
civil liberties and political rights and a composite democracy score, which is a revised 
combined POLITY IV score from the Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management.  The original Freedom House ratings are reversed on a scale from 1 to 7, 
with the lowest value indicating no liberty or rights.  The POLITY IV democracy score is 
measured on a scale from 10 to -10, with 10 indicating strong democracy and -10 
indicating strong autocracy. 
The results with democratic institutions are shown in Table 5 for each of the four 
measures of structural progressivity.  We report only estimated coefficients on 
progressivity, democratic institutions, and their interaction.  Other covariates have similar 
effect as in Table 3 and thus not reported.  It is interesting that in countries with zero 
structural progressivity, the direct effect of democratic institutions on income inequality 
is inconsistent across specifications and varies from zero to positive.  What stays 
consistent across all specifications and all measures of democracy and structural 
progressivity is that the negative effect of progressivity on observed income inequality is 
reinforced by democratic institutions.  Civil and political liberties are estimated to 
improve the effectiveness of the progressivity measures.  
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The results show that using progressivity as a means of equalizing income may 
not be the best policy to implement in environments that offer little in the way of pro-
poor redistribution.  This further implies that equalizing the distribution of income may 
require not only progressive tax structures, but also active redistribution policy on the 
expenditure side of the budget. 
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Table 5. Structural Progressivity and the Role of Democratic Institutions 
 Progressivity Measures 
 MRP1 MRP2 ARP1 ARP2 
Progressivity 143.289*** 17.483 41.347 -18.921 
 (43.616) (21.216) (54.228) (28.964) 
Civil liberties 0.264 -0.145 0.354 0.069 
 (0.458) (0.368) (0.395) (0.343) 
Progressivity*Civil liberties -28.422*** -8.136** -24.881*** -6.792 
 (6.966) (3.273) (8.410) (4.497) 
N (observations) 1100 1100 1100 1103 
R-squared 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.53 
Progressivity 143.519*** 55.826** 162.981*** 56.634* 
 (42.603) (21.975) (56.260) (30.688) 
Political rights 0.062 0.030 0.617* 0.283 
 (0.368) (0.295) (0.318) (0.293) 
Progressivity*Political rights -26.745*** -13.851*** -42.972*** -18.159*** 
 (6.471) (3.287) (8.413) (4.577) 
N (observations) 1100 1100 1100 1103 
R-squared 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.54 
Progressivity 88.655*** 11.095 21.740 -8.226 
 (20.845) (10.763) (28.264) (13.592) 
Democracy score 0.571*** 0.358*** 0.582*** 0.355*** 
 (0.134) (0.105) (0.116) (0.098) 
Progressivity*Democracy score -15.398*** -5.912*** -17.989*** -7.118*** 
 (2.270) (1.112) (2.901) (1.420) 
N (observations) 1030 1030 1030 1033 
R-squared 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.54 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  The dependent variable is GINI in gross/net income.  All specifications include the same 
set of covariates as in Table 3 except for democratic institutions and their interaction with progressivity 
measures reported above.  Original Freedom House 7-point ratings for civil liberties and political rights are 
on the reverse scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is no freedom.  Democracy score is a revised combined POLITY 
v.4 score that ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). 
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The Effect of Progressivity on Inequality in Consumption 
One of the main predictions of the theoretical model is that changes in 
progressivity may affect true and observed income inequality differently.  This theoretical 
result is very important since it suggests that policies that are often thought to reduce 
income inequality may actually be worsening the distribution of income.  Likewise, 
policies that appear to be worsening the distribution of income may in reality be more 
equalizing.  For example, one argument against implementing a flat rate personal income 
tax is that it is unfair and will lead to high levels of inequality.  However, if tax evasion is 
widely spread and the evasion response to tax changes is large relative to the productivity 
response among the rich, then increases in observed inequality can be misleading.  That 
is, such observed changes would hide the equalizing effect on the distribution of true 
(reported and hidden) after-tax income.  According to our theoretical framework, this 
differential effect of tax changes is increasing with the share of unreported income in the 
economy.   
The difficulty in testing this hypothesis is that no measure of true income 
inequality exists.  Such a measure requires that individuals report their true disposable 
income to surveyors.  This, it is well known, is not the case.  Individuals often 
underreport their income to tax authorities.  Also, possibly out of fear that they will be 
caught and penalized, they tend to underreport their income on surveys as well.  In an 
effort to measure true income inequality, we therefore rely on expenditures/consumption-
based GINIs as a proxy for true income inequality.  The logic behind this choice is that it 
is relatively more difficult for individuals to hide their expenditures.  That is, we assume 
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that the consumption levels people report on surveys is closer to true net income than the 
income they report; both of which are assumed to be larger than income reported for 
taxation purposes.  Given this assumption, the estimated effect of progressivity on 
consumption-based GINIs will represent a lower bound on the effect on true income 
inequality. 
A more serious problem, however, is the limited number of countries for which 
consumption-based GINIs are calculated.  Furthermore, as is evident from Figure B1, 
there is a systematic difference in the type of countries that use a given income base for 
GINI calculation.  We observe, for example, that rich and upper middle income countries 
are underrepresented in consumption-based GINIs while low and lower middle income 
countries are overrepresented.  This implies that any differential effect in progressivity 
obtained without considering this selection issue may be purely spurious.  To correct for 
this sample selection problem, we develop sample probability weights using the 
following procedure. 
First, we divide the whole universe of independent countries in a given year into 3 
equal groups by population and 4 equal groups by GDP per capita (in 1990 USD).  This 
gives us a total of 12 population-GDP cells (3 x 4) for which we calculate the number of 
countries in the general population in a given year (NPt).  Then, for each income base 
separately (gross income, net income, and consumption), we calculate the number of 
countries in our estimation sample that is in each population-GDP cell in a given year 
(NSt).  The ratio of NSt to NPt is the probability that a given country observation (for a 
given income base) is included in the estimation sample.  For example, a ratio of 1/5 
means that only 20 percent of the world countries from a specific cell are included in the 
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estimation sample in a given year.  We use the inverse of this probability, which varies 
from 1 to 24 with a mean of 3.75, as the probability sample weight in our subsequent 
estimations. 
To capture the differential effect of progressivity on inequality in observed 
income vs. consumption, we re-estimate the baseline model with interaction terms for 
different income bases.  The estimated model is specified as follows: 
itititnitgitittit WZDPDPPI εφδλλβξα +++⋅+⋅+++= 11     21  
where Dg and Dn are dummy variables which are equal to one if the GINI base is gross or 
net income, respectively.  Consumption-based GINI is the omitted base category.  The 
remaining variables are as defined in eq. (20) except that W no longer includes the 
indicator for income base.  From hypothesis 3, we expect both λs to be negative.  The 
sign of β , however, is not clear as it depends on the spread of evasion and its 
responsiveness to tax changes and may or may not be positive.   
The model is estimated separately for each measure of progressivity; the OLS 
results with and without the probability sample weights are reported in Table 6.  Since the 
OLS results may be biased, we also implement estimation with instrumental variables – 
the distance-population weighted average of the corresponding progressivity measure in 
bordering countries and its interactions with the GINI income base.  The large Shea’s 
partial R-squared indicate that the chosen instruments are not weak.  Examinations of the 
interaction terms reveal strong support for our hypothesis that progressivity has a 
differential effect on inequality in consumption vs. inequality in observed income.  The 
estimated coefficients on interaction terms (λs) are negative and statistically significant 
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across all specifications and all measures of progressivity.  What is also interesting is the 
increase in the size and significance of λ as we move from gross to net income-based 
measures of income inequality.  At the same time, the sign of the OLS-estimated β  
coefficients (both weighted and unweighted) is not consistent across specifications and 
shifting from negative to positive.  In this regard, the IV estimates provide more 
consistent results and point to the negative effect of structural progressivity on inequality 
in consumption.  The effect is statistically significant in 3 of 4 specifications.  These 
results indicate that for a typical country in the sample, while progressivity reduces 
inequality in both observed income and consumption, it appears to have much greater 
influence on net income-based GINIs.   
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Table 6. Differential Effect on Consumption vs Observed Income Inequality 
 Progressivity Measures 
 MRP1 MRP2 ARP1 ARP2 
Panel A: OLS unweighted estimates 
Progressivity 52.420*** 2.278 -21.417 -32.085*** 
 (18.976) (9.102) (23.044) (10.111) 
Progressivity*Gross income -46.211** -20.789** -52.302** -15.303 
 (21.585) (9.803) (24.275) (11.293) 
Progressivity*Net income -93.205*** -46.963*** -111.808*** -38.373*** 
 (20.327) (9.839) (24.592) (11.240) 
GINI income base     
Gross income 10.840*** 10.128*** 10.317*** 9.818*** 
 (1.242) (1.066) (1.133) (1.041) 
Net income 6.819*** 6.163*** 6.521*** 4.861*** 
 (1.149) (1.061) (1.163) (1.062) 
N (observations) 1376 1376 1376 1379 
R-squared 0.42 0.45 0.46 0.48 
Panel B: OLS estimates with probability sample weights 
Progressivity 49.275** 5.560 -8.220 -25.498** 
 (20.163) (9.957) (25.568) (12.037) 
Progressivity*Gross income -39.183* -23.367** -59.689** -22.050* 
 (23.001) (10.780) (27.240) (13.131) 
Progressivity*Net income -92.633*** -47.627*** -115.739*** -39.597*** 
 (21.337) (10.623) (26.914) (12.798) 
GINI income base     
Gross income 11.364*** 11.153*** 11.302*** 10.910*** 
 (1.297) (1.090) (1.179) (1.078) 
Net income 7.596*** 6.733*** 7.111*** 5.407*** 
 (1.213) (1.094) (1.196) (1.105) 
N (observations) 1376 1376 1376 1379 
R-squared 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.52 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. The dependent variable is GINI in either gross/net income or 
expenditures/consumption.  GINI in consumption is the omitted category for the income base.  All 
specifications include the same set of covariates as in Table 3. 
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Table 6 – Continued. 
 Progressivity Measures 
 MRP1 MRP2 ARP1 ARP2 
Panel C: IV estimates with probability sample weights 
Progressivity -94.247 -166.785*** -205.317*** -118.846*** 
 (70.899) (53.589) (55.481) (24.950) 
Progressivity*Gross income -239.419*** -26.673 -76.053 -14.721 
 (69.731) (38.380) (52.369) (24.647) 
Progressivity*Net income -309.775*** -129.858*** -182.409*** -70.702*** 
 (72.892) (41.670) (51.152) (23.236) 
GINI income base     
Gross income 18.585*** 8.403*** 10.542*** 9.471*** 
 (3.287) (3.234) (2.104) (1.780) 
Net income 15.737*** 13.163*** 9.978*** 8.457*** 
 (3.112) (3.252) (1.963) (1.676) 
N (observations) 1191 1191 1191 1194 
     
Shea’s partial R2 (first stage)     
Progressivity 0.169 0.113 0.275 0.276 
Progressivity*Gross income 0.251 0.265 0.400 0.378 
Progressivity*Net income 0.203 0.225 0.380 0.357 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. The dependent variable is GINI in either gross/net income or expenditures/consumption.  
GINI in consumption is the omitted category for the income base.  All specifications include the same set 
of covariates as in Table 3.  IVs are the distance-population weighted average of the corresponding 
progressivity measure in bordering countries and its interactions with the GINI income base.  The models 
are just identified. 
 
 
We argued earlier that tax evasion can explain the difference between the effect of 
progressivity on observed net income and its effect on true income approximated by 
consumption.  Hence, we expect that the difference between these two effects is likely to 
increase with the share of hidden income in the economy.  In other words, country A, 
with identical progressivity but lower incidence of tax evasion than country B, will be 
more effective in reducing inequality via its progressive tax structure.   
Although we cannot measure the extent of tax evasion, we can reasonably assume 
that weak legal institutions and ineffective law enforcement are highly correlated with tax 
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evasion (Allingham and Sandmo 1972).  Thus, we can anticipate that countries with 
stronger law and order will have a greater impact of progressivity on consumption 
inequality.  This last hypothesis is tested by using consumption-based GINIs as the 
dependent variable and including interaction terms between progressivity and the law and 
order index obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Table 7 reports the estimates of the following model: 
ititititititittit WZLPLPI εφδπσβξα +++⋅++++=      22 
where Lit is the law and order index for country i in year t.  The model is estimated by 
OLS and IV methods using the distance-population weighted average of the 
corresponding progressivity measure in bordering countries and its interaction with the 
law and order index as instrumental variables.  
The results reported in Table 7 are largely consistent with our expectations despite 
a relatively small sample size of consumption-based GINIs (N=220).  We note, for 
example, that for countries with the worse law and order (index=0), the estimated βs are 
positive and statistically significant for all progressivity measures; they are also large in 
magnitude.  This result suggests that a positive relationship between progressivity and 
consumption-based inequality might exist, especially in countries with poor institutions.  
The coefficients on interaction terms are all negative and thus support the hypothesis that 
progressivity has the most equalizing effect in economic environments less conducive to 
tax evasion. 
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Table 7. The Effect of Progressivity and Law and Order on Inequality in Consumption 
 Progressivity Measures 
 MRP1 MRP2 ARP1 ARP2 
Panel A: OLS estimates with probability sample weights 
Progressivity 123.257** 69.882** 220.034*** 93.332** 
 (55.926) (27.892) (72.221) (40.170) 
Law and order -0.078 0.025 0.572 0.010 
 (1.017) (0.847) (0.971) (0.855) 
Progressivity *Law and order -21.586 -17.505* -57.483*** -28.477*** 
 (16.580) (8.909) (20.908) (9.821) 
N (observations) 220 220 220 220 
R-squared 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 
Panel B: IV estimates with probability sample weights 
Progressivity 373.247*** 349.689*** 664.509*** 402.991* 
 (96.584) (97.715) (179.011) (214.568) 
Law and order 1.094 2.227 2.560** 2.025* 
 (1.479) (1.625) (1.306) (1.177) 
Progressivity *Law and order -55.935** -64.909*** -143.961*** -95.026*** 
 (25.233) (21.152) (37.964) (36.336) 
N (observations) 185 185 185 185 
     
Shea’s partial R2 (first stage)     
Progressivity 0.281 0.173 0.274 0.116 
Progressivity *Law and order 0.291 0.213 0.333 0.258 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  The dependent variable is GINI in consumption. All specifications include the same 
set of covariates as in Table 3.  The law and order index is measured on a scale from 0 to 6, with 0 
representing the worst law and order.  IVs are the distance-population weighted average of the 
corresponding progressivity measure in bordering countries and its interaction with the law and order 
index.  The models are just identified. 
 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we develop a theoretical framework that yields four testable 
hypotheses about the relationship between tax progressivity and income inequality.  
Firstly, we show that increased structural progressivity of the PIT structure reduces 
observed income inequality (hypothesis 1), and that this effect depends on the type of 
redistributive environment (hypothesis 2).  We also show that structural progressivity has 
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a differential effect on observed vs. actual income inequality (hypothesis 3), and that the 
difference between two effects is positively related to the spread of tax evasion in the 
economy (hypothesis 4).   
We develop and estimate comprehensive, time-varying measures of structural 
progressivity of national income tax systems.  We then use these progressivity measures 
and the GINI coefficients to test the above four hypotheses.  As predicted, we find that 
PIT progressivity reduces observed inequality in reported gross and net income and show 
that this negative effect on observed income inequality is particularly strong in countries 
with more developed democratic institutions.  At the same time, we find a significantly 
smaller negative effect of PIT progressivity on true inequality, approximated by 
consumption-based measures of GINI.  We also establish that the effect of tax 
progressivity on consumption inequality can be positive, especially in countries with 
weak law and order that increase the likelihood of tax evasion. 
Our empirical analysis implies that the tradeoff between equity and efficiency 
does in fact exist.  This follows from the negative relationship that we identify between 
progressivity and income inequality.  The result suggests that as taxes become more 
efficient, via lower progressivity, income inequality tends to increase.  This result by 
itself points to the importance of taking into account the equity effects of shifts in tax 
policy towards greater efficiency.   
What we find particularly interesting, though, is that the cost of efficiency differs 
across country groups.  Because tax evasion is so pervasive in developing countries, our 
results lead us to speculate that developing countries face much lower equity cost of 
efficiency.  That is, to the extent that efficiency is achieved by lowering the progressivity 
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of taxes, developing countries with their higher levels of tax evasion, lose a lot less in 
terms of equity than developed countries.  If flatter taxes can reduce the size of the 
underground economy, then they may actually improve the distribution of income via the 
direct compliance response and via pro-poor redistribution of increased tax revenues 
from higher levels of compliance.  Developed countries with higher tax compliance rates 
to begin with, however, may not benefit much from this evasion effect.  This may explain 
why flat taxes are relatively more popular in developing countries than developed 
countries. 
Our results have important policy implications, especially given the debate 
surrounding the implementation of flat taxes.  The common argument is to say that flat 
taxes, while efficient, will lead to higher levels of income inequality.  We are arguing that 
this need not be the case for all countries. While observed income inequality will likely 
increase following the implementation of a flat tax, actual income inequality may not 
change and may even improve in countries that suffer from high levels of tax evasion. 
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ESSAY 2: BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES AND THE EQUITY EFFECTS OF 
PERSONAL INCOME TAXES 
Introduction 
A casual inspection of personal income tax systems across the world reveals a 
dramatic shift in income tax policy over the last thirty years.  Top statutory PIT rates 
have fallen by more than 20 percentage points on average (Sabirianova Peter, Buttrick, 
and Duncan 2010).  Marginal rates throughout the income distribution as well as 
measures of average rate progression all point to lower levels of income tax progressivity.  
In fact, regardless of the measure used, PIT schedules are significantly flatter today than 
they were in the late 1970s. Additionally, an increasing number of countries have adopted 
or are considering the adoption of a linear PIT schedule.  The most popular among these 
is the Russian flat tax reform of 2001, which is believed to have acted as a catalyst for 
other countries in recent years.21   
This trend toward flatter PIT schedules has generated significant debate in tax 
policy circles.  For example, Fuest, Piechl, and Schaefer (2008)is among a long list of 
papers that try to evaluate the distributional impact of flat taxes.  These studies 
unanimously argue against the adoption of a flat tax in Western European countries on 
the grounds that the equity costs are too high.  In other words, flattening the PIT schedule 
would increase efficiency but worsen the distribution of income.  
                                                 
21 Current estimates put the number of countries with a flat rate PIT at 24 as at January 1st 2009.  This 
number is up from 14 in 2005.  The majority of countries using the flat rate PIT are the former communist 
countries of Eastern Europe. 
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However, these results fail to explain the continuous decline in income inequality in 
Russia even after the flat tax was adopted in 2001.  One is therefore left to question 
whether a flatter PIT schedule necessarily increases income inequality.   
The conventional argument is simple; a flatter PIT reduces the tax burden facing 
the rich relative to the poor thus increasing the inequality in net income.  Simultaneously, 
those affected by the lower tax burden are induced to change their behavior in ways that 
improve efficiency.  Then, if these tax-induced behavioral responses are relatively greater 
among the rich, the pre-tax income of the rich increases relative to that of the poor thus 
leading to a further increase in net income inequality.  That is, flattening PIT schedules 
increases income inequality due to changes in the tax burden as well as through tax-
induced changes in behavior.  Following this reasoning, one is forced to reject efforts to 
flatten PIT schedules if equity is a major policy concern.  
However, the analysis above ignores the fact that tax-induced behavioral 
responses include evasion and avoidance, both of which are income shifting activities 
rather than real changes in income.  These income shifting activities necessitates that a 
distinction be made between observed and actual net income inequality.  While the 
conclusions above still hold for observed net income, the distributional impact of PIT 
rates on actual net income inequality is likely to be ambiguous and possibly 
counterintuitive under certain conditions.  For example, if the rich are induced to report a 
greater share of their hidden income, both reported gross and net income inequality will 
rise while actual net income inequality will fall.  This example is simple but quite 
powerful.  It shows that studying the distributional impact of tax reforms requires that a 
distinction be made between actual and reported income inequality.  It also points to the 
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need to carefully identify the various channels through which taxes affect the distribution 
of income as these channels need not all work in the same direction.  
The objective of the current paper is to decompose the distributional effect of the 
personal income tax (PIT) into its direct effect and indirect effect.  The direct effect is the 
change in net income distribution that occurs if PIT rates change and pre-tax income 
remains the same.  The indirect effect, on the other hand, arises because of changes in 
pre-tax income induced by the tax reform as well as other factors unrelated to the tax 
system.  We also extend the literature by identifying the tax-induced behavioral responses 
that contribute to the indirect effect.  The tax-induced indirect effect is comprised of 
several components related to the many dimensions along which individuals may adjust 
their income in response to tax changes.  Following GMP, we classify these responses 
into two broad categories; evasion/avoidance and real productivity effects.22   
In sum, the paper answers the following questions; how much of the change in the 
distribution of net income can we attribute to the personal income tax system?  How 
much of the tax-induced change in the distribution is due to the direct tax effect vis-à-vis 
the indirect effect?  Which channel, evasion or productivity, for example, is the major 
driving force behind the indirect effect?  Do these tax-induced behavioral responses 
affect reported net income inequality differently than actual net income inequality?   
We implement the analysis using data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey (RLMS) to study the distributional impact of the Russian flat tax reform.  We rely 
                                                 
22The productivity effect is broadly defined to include all the possible behavioral changes that can affect the 
total income earned except compliance, which is identified separately.  The indirect effect also includes 
non-tax induced changes in behavior.  However, the primary focus of this paper is on the distributional 
impact of tax-induced behavioral responses. 
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on a micro-simulation counterfactual analysis and elasticities of evasion and productivity 
to decompose the change in income inequality into the various channels.  Following the 
literature, we use consumption as a proxy for actual net income with the gap between 
consumption and reported net income reflecting the extent of underreporting.   
The results show that indirect behavioral responses had a significantly larger 
effect on the distribution of income than the mechanical direct tax effect.  We identify the 
tax-induced components of the indirect effect and show that the evasion response had a 
larger impact on inequality than productivity responses.  While the qualitative effect of 
productivity responses is the same for both reported net income and actual net income 
(consumption), we find that the sign of the evasion effect depends on the income 
measure.  The results show that the evasion response lowered actual net income 
inequality while increasing reported net income inequality.  However, the combined tax-
induced effects cannot explain the decline in income inequality observed in Russia over 
the sample period.   
This analysis makes several important contributions to the literature.  It is the first 
study to identify the relative size and sign of the various channels through which the 
Russian flat tax reform affected the distribution of income.  The existing literature either 
focuses on the US PIT system (Alm, Lee, and Wallace 2005; Poterba 2007) or use 
hypothetical flat tax reforms in Western Europe (Fuest, Peichl, and Schaefer 2008).  It is 
also the first paper to decompose the tax-induced behavioral effects into evasion and 
productivity responses.  Existing work in this area have identified parts of the 
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productivity response (Altig and Carlstrom 1999) while no one has so far identified the 
evasion effect.23   
The paper also makes worthy contributions to tax policy debates.  For example, 
we show that changes in gross income are more important that changes in tax rates, 
income shifting (evasion/avoidance responses) has a greater effect than real productivity 
changes, and that tax-induced responses are not as important as other factors that affect 
gross income.  These results imply that separating tax policy from income redistribution 
policies is more effective than redistribution via taxes.  Therefore, our results will help 
policy makers design policies that target specific channels in an effort to improve the 
distribution of income.  For example, our results imply that investing in education and 
other training programs that improve employability and earning power would have a 
more significant effect on reducing inequality than tax progressivity.  
A final contribution of the paper relates to the popular efficiency equity trade-off 
literature.  To see this contribution, it is important to recognize that changes in inequality 
that arise from income shifting via evasion/avoidance reflect pre-existing inequality and 
are therefore somewhat artificial.  In other words, observed inequality can increase if a 
lower tax rate causes individuals in the right tail of the income distribution to report a 
relatively greater share of their income.  This increase in inequality represents a shift 
toward the true inequality that existed prior to the tax change.  Therefore, to the extent 
that this “artificial” effect is relatively large, the actual equity costs of the efficiency 
                                                 
23 We distinguish between the compliance effect and productivity effect.  Gramlich, Kasten, and 
Sammartino (1993) and Altig and Carlstrom (1999) are limited in this respect; the first focus on labor 
supply and capital gains while the latter focuses on labor supply and savings.  Also, Alm, Lee, and Wallace 
(2005) and Poterba (2007) only identify the direct and indirect effects.  They don’t identify the tax-induced 
behavioral effects.  
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gained from switching to a flatter tax schedule will be much lower than observed.  In this 
case, it is optimal to adopt a flatter tax schedule not only because it is more efficient but 
also because the true equity effects are smaller than we think.  In fact, our results show 
that it is possible to improve both efficiency and equity in countries with high levels of 
evasion that is very responsive to tax rates.   
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows.  A brief review of the relevant 
literature and the theoretical framework is presented in that order.  This is followed by a 
discussion of the empirical strategy, a brief summary of the Russian tax reform, and the 
data.  The paper ends with a discussion of the results and concluding remarks.   
Literature Review 
As indicated throughout the introduction, the broad question addressed in this 
chapter is not entirely new.  In fact, it has been shown that behavioral responses to tax 
changes have important distributional consequences.  The two previous studies in this 
area that are most closely related to our work are (Alm, Lee, and Wallace 2005; Poterba 
2007).  Both studies examine the effect of U.S. taxes on the distribution of income and 
find that the income tax is progressive as it helps to equalize the post tax distribution of 
income.  More importantly, they both conclude that changes in pretax income have a 
greater effect on post tax income distribution than changes in the effective tax rate.  
While it is clear that most of the effect is via indirect behavioral changes such as labor 
supply, avoidance, and evasion, neither Poterba (2007) nor Alm, Lee and Wallace (2005) 
attempt to separate these effects.  They instead focus on the aggregate indirect effect. 
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While informative, this approach masks much of the more detail responses that 
would be of interest to policymakers.  For example, which behavioral responses are the 
main drivers of the indirect effect?  Are individuals changing their labor supply, their 
saving pattern, or are they changing how they report income?  It is also important to 
know if each of these responses affects the distribution of income in the same direction.  
Two earlier studies, Altig and Carlstrom (1999) and Gramlich, Kasten, and 
Sammartino (1993), made important contributions in this regard using different 
methodologies.  Altig and Carlsrom (1999) use a computable general–equilibrium (CGE) 
framework to determine the effect of marginal tax rates on the distribution of income and 
find that behavioral responses in the form of labor supply and savings have a significant 
impact on income inequality.  On the other hand, Gramlich, Kasten, and Sammartino 
(1993) rely on a simulation approach with previous estimates of net wage labor supply 
elasticities for primary and secondary earners and the elasticity of capital gains to taxes.24  
According to their results, the net effect of these two behavioral responses is 
approximately zero.  That is, when taken together, they find that these two responses did 
not contribute much to the increased inequality observed over the period of study.   
Although Altig and Carlstrom (1999)and Gramlich, Kasten, and Sammartino 
(1993) identify particular behavioral responses, they do not include all the possible 
sources of behavioral responses that may affect the distribution of income.  While 
savings, labor supply, and capital gains should definitely be included, they do not capture 
the full range of responses that account for changes in pretax income distribution.  For 
                                                 
24 Gramlich, Kasten, and Sammartino (1993) uses the response of capital gains and labor supply in their 
assessment of taxes on the pretax income distribution. We intend to group all productivity effects together 
and also identify a compliance effect. 
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example, hours worked is only one way in which individuals may adjust their labor 
income in response to higher taxes.  Besides the many other ways in which earned 
income may be adjusted, the authors also exclude many of the other productivity 
responses such as accounting, timing and consumption patterns.  In particular, there is no 
mention of evasion as a possible behavioral response.   
One way to capture the full range of behavioral responses is to use a measure of 
income elasticity instead of labor supply or saving elasticities.  For example, Auten and 
Carroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002) use the taxable income elasticity approach 
popularized by Feldstein to emphasize the importance of tax rates in explaining changes 
in the distribution of income.  Since this elasticity captures all the various tax induced 
behavioral responses, it should give a more accurate picture of the distributional changes 
that are due to behavioral responses.  However, this approach is not without its own 
problems.  While the income elasticity does contain information that is pertinent to 
determine the effect of taxes on the distribution of income, its aggregate nature is a 
disadvantage especially if the various behavioral responses don’t all work in the same 
direction.   
For example, we argue in this and the previous chapter that the evasion response 
will have an artificial effect on the distribution of income and will affect true and 
reported income differently while real side responses will affect both true and reported 
income the same way.  Because both effects are aggregated in the income elasticity, this 
approach does not provide a completely accurate picture of the impact of tax changes on 
the distribution of income.  That is, the reason for the change in income will not be clear.  
Is it that (1) compliance increased, (2) productivity increased or (3) both?  If the change 
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in income is driven by compliance alone then the effect on the distribution of income is 
likely to be artificial.  The presence of a productivity effect, on the other hand, may have 
a real impact on the distribution of income.  It is important, then, that these two effects be 
disentangled if one is to arrive at a complete and accurate picture of how taxes affect the 
distribution of income.   
Theoretical Framework 
In this section we describe the theoretical framework used to inform the empirical 
analysis.  To fix ideas, consider Figure 3.  Assume that the rich hide a greater share of 
their income relative to the poor25 and that the PIT schedule is progressive.  Under these 
assumptions, actual gross income is more unequally distributed than reported gross 
income, ( ) ( )oYY ψψ >*  and actual net income is more unequally distributed than reported 
net income ( ) ( )oyy ψψ >* ; ( )*ψ  is an inequality index with larger values indicating higher 
levels of inequality.  Now assume that a linear personal income tax schedule is adopted, 
which induces individuals to increase actual gross income, Y*and decrease hidden 
income, E.   
                                                 
25 This is not an innocuous assumption as there is evidence that compliance is lowest at the two endpoints 
of the income distribution (Alm, Bahl, and Murray 1990; Bloomquist 2003).  Third-party reporting and the 
high share of labor income for individuals in the middle of the distribution explain much of this 
relationship.  However, we make this assumption since the focus is on developing countries where it is 
more likely to hold due to less effective third party reporting and law enforcement.  Most incidence studies 
find that PIT schedules, even in developing countries, are progressive; Martinez-Vazquez (2008) provides 
an extensive review of the tax incidence literature. 
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Figure 3. True and Reported Income Flow 
 
PIT 
Function 
yo
Yo 
E y*
Tax  
Y* 
Notes: The arrows indicate the direction in which income flows.  For example, an individual must allocate 
true pre-tax income, Y*, between evaded income, E, and reported income, Yo.  Reported income passes 
through the PIT function which produces taxes and reported net income, yo.  The evaded income plus the 
reported net income gives the true net income, y*.   The broken arrow indicates one possible reallocation of 
income following a reduction in tax rates.  That is, lower tax rates may induce individuals to report a 
greater share of their income, thus reducing the share that is hidden.  A missing link in this figure is the 
flow of welfare benefits to true pre-tax income (if taxable) or to observed net income (if non-taxable). 
 
 
It is important to realize that the tax reform will affect the distribution of reported 
net income via a direct channel and an indirect channel, which is due to tax-induced 
changes in Y* and E, and other non-tax related factors.  If the indirect effect is relatively 
greater among the rich, then reported net income will become more unequally distributed.  
More importantly, the change in reported inequality is likely to be different than the 
change in actual inequality because of the evasion effect.  To see this more clearly, 
assume that the tax-induced productivity effect is zero and that compliance increases to 
100 percent.  Under these assumptions, hidden income falls to zero and the new observed 
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net income distribution would be more unequal than its pre-reform counterpart but less 
unequal than the pre-reform true net income distribution; i.e.,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )otottt yyyy 1** 1 −− >=> ψψψψ .  While it is clear that observed inequality has increased, 
the reality is that the distribution of true post-reform net income is more equal than its 
pre-reform counterpart.  In other words, the evasion response increases observed 
inequality but reduces true inequality.  It also follows from this example that the observed 
change in the distribution of net income includes an artificial component, which results in 
an overstatement of the change in inequality.26     
See Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2008) (Essay I) for a more formal treatment 
of the above analysis.  
Russia and the Flat Tax 
Although the issues discussed in this paper apply broadly to all countries, the data 
requirement greatly restrict the number of countries for which the analysis can be 
implemented. The ideal data set would have longitudinal data on true and reported gross 
income before and after a major tax reform.  This would allow us to identify the evasion 
and real productivity elasticities using appropriate econometric techniques.  The data 
would also include information on deductions, credits and other allowances, tax liability, 
and hence measures of net income.  Unfortunately, these data do not exist for any country 
in the world.  We overcome these data limitations by focusing on Russia.  We should 
note that Russia does have certain limitations that must also be addressed for the study to 
                                                 
26 Implicit in this example is the assumption that the percentage change in evasion is greater than the 
percentage change in the tax rate and that the tax reform affects the rich disproportionately.   
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be feasible.  Below we describe the pros and cons of analyzing Russia as well as the 
assumptions under which the analysis is valid.   
The most critical parameters needed for the analysis are the evasion and 
productivity elasticities.  Although Russia does not have data on true gross income or 
evasion, a recent study by  GMP uses the 2001 Russian flat tax reform and data from the 
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) to estimate these elasticities based on 
the consumption income gap approach.  Their approach is valid under the assumption that 
consumption is a good proxy for actual net income and that the gap between consumption 
and reported net income is due primarily to underreporting rather than dissaving.27  For 
these same reasons, we are able to use consumption as a proxy for actual net income in 
our analysis.  The corresponding gross income measures are obtained by inverting the tax 
function in each period taking into account basic deductions, which are available to 
everyone.   
Also contributing to the choice of Russia is the fact that they implemented one of 
the most significant PIT reforms of the 21st century.  The graduated PIT schedule was 
replaced with a linear PIT on January 1st 2001 (Table 8).  The two top rates of 30 and 20 
percent were eliminated and the threshold increased from 3168 rubles to 4800 rubles.  
The reform also eliminated the 1 percent social contribution, which employees were 
required to pay.  Therefore, everyone paid the same flat rate of 13 percent after the 
                                                 
27 GMP provides a number of reasons and empirical test to demonstrate that this is indeed the case for 
Russia.  They show that consumption is greater than income for the entire sample period, that the gap 
declined after the tax reform, that the saving rate remained stable for the duration of the sample at around 6 
percent, and that the level of saving required to explain the gap is approximately -30 percent.  
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reform as long as their income was above 4800 rubles.28  From Table 8, we observe that 
individuals making over 50,000 rubles were the primary beneficiaries of the reform.  
Therefore, focusing on Russia allows me to identify the distributional impact of an actual 
flat PIT reform, which is an advantage over studies that focus on hypothetical reforms 
(Fuest, Peichl, and Schaefer 2008).  We describe the data set used and provide more 
information on the required variables in the following sections. 
 
28 For a more extended description of the reform see Martinez-Vazquez, Rider, and Wallace (2008) and 
Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm (2005). 
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Table 8. The PIT Rate Structure Before and After Reform 
Before Reform (2000) After Reform (2001-2004) 
Taxable Income1 Marginal Rate Taxable Income1 Marginal Rate 
Below 3,168 0 Below 4,800 0 
3,168 to 50,000 13 Above 4,800 13 
50,000 to 150,000 21   
Above 150,000 31   
Source(s): Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm (2005) 
Note: Marginal rates include the 1% payroll tax. 
 
 
Empirical Strategy 
This section outlines the empirical approach that is used to determine the effect of 
taxes on the distribution of income.  We use estimates of the elasticity of true gross 
income with respect to taxes and the elasticity of evasion with respect to taxes to simulate 
counterfactual net income distributions, which are then used to decompose the change in 
the distribution of net income into direct, evasion and productivity effects.29  Auten and 
Carroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002) use the reported taxable income elasticity 
popularized by Feldstein (1995)to emphasize the importance of tax rates in explaining 
changes in the distribution of income.  Although this approach can be used to identify the 
tax-induced indirect effect, we argue that it will lead to an overstatement of the change in 
the distribution of net income because it fails to distinguish between evasion and real 
productivity responses.30  To illustrate, write reported taxable income as ( )EYY o −= * .  
                                                 
29 Poterba (2007) and Alm, Lee, and Wallace (2005) uses a similar counterfactual analysis to identify the 
direct and indirect effects.   
 
30 It has been shown, both theoretically and empirically, that the taxable income elasticity also overstates 
the efficiency gains/losses of a tax change if the elasticity is driven by evasion or avoidance that involves 
 
67 
 
Differentiating with respect to t and writing in elasticity form yields ( )EEyYttoy εε −=∂∂ *1 , 
which includes the two main parameters of interest: the elasticity of true income yε  and 
the elasticity of evasion Eε .  Since evasion leads to artificial changes in the distribution of 
net income, using the responsiveness of taxable income to identify the effect of taxes on 
the distribution of income would lead to incorrect conclusions.  It is for this reason that 
each component must be separately identified. 
Identification of the distributional effect 
The distributional impact of the tax reform is obtained using a counterfactual 
based analysis as in Alm, Lee, and Wallace (2005) and Poterba (2007).  Implementation 
is via micro-simulation exercises that allow me to examine the effect of taxes on the 
distribution of income with and without behavioral responses.  The methodology is 
implemented in several steps.  First, we calculate an index of the income distribution for 
the pre-reform period (year 2000) and the post-reform period (years 2002 and 2003).31  
These two measures are used to calculate the total change in the distribution of net 
income between the two periods.  We then calculate two counterfactual net income 
distributions; net income when pre-reform tax schedule is applied to post-reform income 
and net income when post-reform tax schedule is applied to pre-reform income.32  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
only transfer costs (Chetty 2009; and GMP).  Slemrod (1998), Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), and Gruber 
and Saez (2002) provide useful summaries of the taxable income elasticity literature.   
 
31We exclude the year of the reform since it may take some time for individuals to fully respond the 
incentives created by the reform (Duncan and Sabirianova Peter, 2010). 
 
32 See Table 9 and Table 10 for a summary of the counterfactual income distributions and how they are 
compared to identify the various components of the change in income distribution.  Estimating the 
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indirect effect is obtained by comparing the former counterfactual distribution with the 
observed pre-reform net income distribution.  Similarly, we obtain the direct effect by 
comparing the latter counterfactual distribution with the observed pre-reform net income 
distribution. 
The second step is to identify the tax-induced behavioral effects which are part of 
the indirect effect.  This is done under two separate approaches.  Under the first, we 
ignore the presence of evasion and treat all changes in reported gross income as real 
changes.  By ignoring the fact that the evasion response affects the distribution of actual 
income differently than it does reported income inequality, this approach should 
overestimate the distributional impact of the tax changes.  We correct for this in the 
second approach, which distinguishes between evasion/avoidance and real productivity 
responses.  Both approaches require information on elasticities of evasion, productivity, 
and reported gross income, the pre-reform gross income distribution, and the pre-reform 
tax schedule.   
Adjusting for behavioral responses 
Below we give a brief description of the approach used to adjust reported gross 
income for evasion and productivity responses.33  First, write reported gross income as
and define the tax-induced change in evasion and true gross income as 
follows: 
igig EYY i −= *
                                                                                                                                                 
counterfactuals require several steps of which the most important is the imputation of gross income.  The 
steps are outlined in detail in the accompanying simulation appendix.   
 
33 A more detailed step by step description of the approach used to adjust gross income for evasion and 
productivity responses is provided in the simulation appendix.   
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Equations (23) and (24) give us the new level of hidden income and true gross 
income induced by a change in the tax rate.  Using eq. (23) and the definition of reported 
gross income, we can write down an expression for the new level of reported income - 
due to the change in evasion as 
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which then implies that the percentage change in individual reported gross income due to 
the change in evasion (assuming no productivity response) is 
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Similarly, the percentage change in individual reported gross income due to the change in 
productivity (assuming no evasion response) can be written as  
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Finally, the percentage change in individual reported gross income due to the change in 
both evasion and productivity is 
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Equations (26), (27), and (28) allow me to write reported gross income adjusted 
for evasion and productivity as ]
1
[ π
πεε
τ
τ
−
−×Δ×+= ey
i
i
igig
ey
ig YYY , which nests the 
evasion effect ( 0=yε ), the productivity effect ( 0=eε ), and the myopic view that ignores 
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the distinction between evasion and real productivity changes (set π=0 and replace the 
elasticity of true income, εy with the elasticity of reported gross income).   
The beauty of this approach is that the level of evasion, which cannot be 
observed, is not needed.  Although the share of evasion in true income,π  is unknown, 
sensitivity analysis can be used to determine its effect on the results.  Using a similar 
procedure, we calculate the change in true gross income as τ
τε Δ××igY *+= yigyig Y **
                                                
Y .  The 
premise of this derivation is that the level and responsiveness of evasion does not affect 
true gross income.34  Adjusting income as suggested above ignores the fact that, tax 
induced changes in savings, say, may lead to changes in capital, which in turn affects 
income.  Our analysis ignores these second round effects.35 
The above procedure allows me to write down counterfactuals that we use to 
determine the size and sign of the evasion and productivity effects.36  We estimate the 
evasion effect, by comparing the pre-reform (year 2000) distribution of net income with 
the distribution of net income that would obtain if the only tax-induced behavioral 
response to the tax reform was evasion.  The productivity effect is obtained similarly, 
except that we assume the only response is through productivity changes.  We also 
estimate the total behavioral effect by allowing both evasion and productivity to change 
simultaneously (calculations are summarized in Table 9 and Table 10).  Finally, we 
 
34 It is possible that the ability to hide income affects the amount of income earned just as the amount of 
income earned might affect the amount of income that individuals hide (Slemrod 2001).  However, 
estimates of these cross elasticities do not yet exist.  As such, we ignore any possible cross effects. 
 
35 See Elmendorf et. al.(2008) for a discussion of these additional second round effects. 
 
36 The adjustments use income in year 2000 as the base.  Additionally, we hold the tax schedule constant so 
that any change must be due to the change in income only; base calculations are done using the pre-reform 
tax schedule.   
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estimate the total tax-induced behavioral effect using the reported gross income elasticity, 
which ignores the difference between evasion and real productivity responses. 
Data 
The data are taken from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), 
which is a household level survey conducted annually since 1992 in two phases.37  It is 
widely representative of the Russian population, covering approximately 32 regions, 38 
randomly selected primary sampling units, and 7 Russian federal districts.  The survey is 
administered in the last quarter of each year and includes four separate questionnaires; 
one for each household, each adult in the household, each child in the household, and a 
community questionnaire.  According to the host website of the RLMS, the response rate 
exceeds 80 percent for households and 95 percent for individuals within each household.  
The data cover more than 4000 households and 10000 adults on average.  Besides the 
relatively large sample size, the data set has a panel feature with two years before and 4 
years after the Russian tax reform, which makes it suitable for our purposes. 
The sample used in the empirical analysis is restricted to households in which at 
least one individual is between the ages of 25 and 60 years old.  This restriction 
eliminates households that are either too young or too old, which may contribute to non-
random fluctuations in income.  Additionally, we focus on the years 2000 (pre-reform 
base year) and 2002 for our base results.  Although the reform became effective on 
                                                 
37 No survey was conducted in 1997 and 1999.  The survey is a joint project between the Population Center 
at the University of North Carolina and the Russian Academy of Sociology.  Information on sample 
selection, attrition and the like can be obtained from the host site; http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms, 
accessed October 2009.   
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January 1st 2001 and data are collected in the last quarter of the year, we exclude the year 
2001 from the analysis to allow individuals more time to respond to the new tax schedule.     
Sample attrition is relatively minor in the RLMS as compared to other large panel 
datasets.  Nonetheless, there is some evidence that the attrition is nonrandom; those who 
leave the sample tend to be more educated, have higher income, and are more likely to 
have lived in Moscow and St. Petersburg (Mu 2006).  This non-random attrition means 
that any observed decline in inequality maybe due to the fact that the upper tail of the 
income distribution loses a relatively larger share of people over time.  However, the 
RLMS makes an effort to replenish the sample over time, especially for Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, thus partly solving the attrition (Gorodnichenko, Sabirianova-Peter, and 
Stolyarov 2009). 
Variables   
The RLMS has some, but not all, of the ideal variables needed to complete the 
analysis.  No data is available for true gross income, reported gross income, true net 
income, or tax liability.  We do have data on reported net income and the tax function, 
including the rules for calculating basic deductions.  We also have data on consumption, 
which we use as a proxy for true net income under the assumption that the consumption 
income gap observed in Russia cannot be explained by dissaving (Gorodnichenko, 
Martinez-Vazquez, and Sabirianova Peter 2009).  The core analysis is conducted at the 
household level because data on consumption and some components of income are only 
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available at the household level.  Where possible we do provide individual level results as 
well.  Below we briefly describe each measure of income.38 
Reported Net Income 
The RLMS collects reported net income data at both the individual and household 
levels.  Individual measures include actual monetary labor income earnings received last 
month and contractual monetary labor earnings (received on average over the last 12 
months). Contractual monetary labor earnings are used to create a third income measure; 
imputed contractual monetary labor earnings.39  Actual income is more prone to monthly 
income shocks, which may be the result of wage arrears, forced leave, and sickness, 
among others.  Contractual earnings on the other hand, are more stable as they reflect the 
usual income received per month over a one year period.  Using the imputed contractual 
earnings is advantageous because it provides a more accurate description of income 
within households, which is the unit of measurement used to test the main hypotheses of 
the paper.  The baseline results at the individual level use imputed contractual labor 
earnings at the primary and secondary job.  Although labor earnings are the only 
component of income available at the individual level, it represents over 80 percent of 
income and should therefore do a good enough job of describing the distributional impact 
of the tax reform at the individual level.  
Imputed contractual labor earnings are summed across individuals within 
households to obtain a base measure of household reported net income.  A second 
                                                 
38 The simulation appendix outlines the iterative process used to recover gross income measures. 
39 The imputation is for working non-respondents.  Because the PIT is assessed on the individual, the 
imputation is done in an effort to obtain an accurate measure of household net income, which involves 
summing tax liability across individuals within households. 
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measure, reported disposable income before public transfers is obtained by adding non-
labor income to household labor earnings.40 
Actual Net Income 
We use consumption as a proxy for actual net income, which is, by definition, 
unobservable.  The fact that consumption is also subjected to under-reporting means that 
it gives us a lower bound on actual net income.  Therefore, any differential effect of taxes 
on consumption should represent a lower bound to the differential effect on actual net 
income.  While income measures are available at both individual and household level, 
consumption is only available at the household level.  We use non-durable consumption, 
which includes expenditure data on more than 55 food items at home and away from 
home plus durable consumption as our baseline measure of true income.41    
Gross Income Measures 
Unfortunately, the RLMS does not collect information on gross income.  Since 
the analysis requires these data, we impute them by inverting the tax function for each 
period.  The implicit assumptions underlying the inversion are that monthly income is 
received uniformly throughout the year and that reported net income reflects tax liability 
actually paid.  Starting with net income, we recover the gross income measures using an 
iterative process in STATA.  The iterative process simultaneously imputes gross income 
and the implied tax liability for each individual.  Next, we calculate gross income at the 
                                                 
40 These include net private transfers and financial income, which are received at the household level. Net 
private transfers refer to receipts (money and in kind) from non-government sources minus contributions to 
individuals outside the household unit.  
 
41 Food items are reported for the last 7 days while other non-durables are reported for the last 30 days.  See 
Table B 3 for a detail description of each variable. 
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household level by adding household level tax liability to the respective measures of 
household net income, where household tax liability is the within household summation 
of the individual level tax liability based on imputed contractual earnings.42  We then 
proceed with the analysis as described in the empirical section and the simulation 
appendix. 
Results 
Implementation of the micro-simulation exercise involves a number of steps that 
are outlined in the simulation appendix.  The first step in the exercise is to recover the 
gross income measures since the RLMS only reports net figures.  The imputed gross 
income measures are then used to calculate each of the counterfactual net incomes 
in Table 10 using the formulas in Table 9.  The counterfactual net incomes are then used 
to calculate several indices of income inequality.  These include the GINI coefficient, 
coefficient of variation (CV), and the variance of log (Var-log).  Baseline indices are 
calculated using only non-zero values of each income measure.  All income/consumption 
measures are converted to December 2002 prices, and household measures are adjusted 
using the OECD equivalence scale.  Additionally, the individual (household) level 
                                                 
42 This is necessary because tax is administered at the individual level.  The alternative would be to impute 
household level gross income measures directly using the iterative procedure that is used for individuals.  
However, this approach would lead to incorrect estimates of pre-reform gross income since the effective 
tax rate of the household would be at least as great as the effective rate facing any given member of that 
household.  This is due to the fact that the pre-reform tax schedule is a graduated one.  It doesn’t matter 
which approach is taken in the post reform period since the tax rate is flat. We base all household level 
gross income measures on the individual level imputed contractual earnings variable in an effort to deal 
with non-response of working adults within some households.   
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inequality indices are calculated using the RLMS individual (household) sample weights 
to address sample attrition and other sampling errors.43 
 
 
43 The RLMS sample weights adjusts for sample design factors and deviations from the census 
characteristics, which implicitly address sample attrition. 
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Table 9.     
Level of analysis Evasion effect Productivity effect Combined effect 
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Notes: The top panel (E1, F1, and G1) uses the pre-reform tax schedule to calculate net income while the bottom panel (E2, F2, and G2) uses the 
post-reform tax schedule.  Superscripts e and y indicate that income has been adjusted for evasion and productivity, respectively.  Consumption 
based measures of household income is adjusted for productivity only.  However, evasion activity at the individual level indirectly affects 
consumption measures via changes in tax liability.  Household tax liability is first calculated at the individual level and then summed over 
individuals within the household. 
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Table 10. Summary of Counterfactual Measures of Net Income 
 Panel A 
Tax schedule Pre-reform Pre-reform Post reform Post reform - - 
Income year Pre-reform Post reform Pre-reform Post reform - - 
ψ(y) A C D B - - 
 Panel B
Tax schedule  Pre-reform Pre-reform Pre-reform Post reform Post reform Post reform 
Income Adjust E Adjust Y Adjust Y&E Adjust E Adjust Y Adjust Y&E 
ψ(y) E1 F1 G1 E2 F2 G2 
 Panel C 
 Tax Behavior  Tax and 
Behavior 
Evasion  Productivity  Productivity and 
evasion 
 D-A C-A B-A E1-A F1-A G1-A 
 B-C B-D  E2-D F2-D G2-D 
Note: ψ(y) is a summary measure of net income distribution (eg., GINI, coefficient of variation etc.).  Counterfactuals in Panel A 
are used to separate the direct (tax) effect from the indirect effect while those in Panel B are used to identify the tax-induced indirect 
(behavioral) effects (evasion and productivity); these are illustrated in Panel C.  For example, the direct (tax) effect is calculated by 
holding the pre-tax distribution of income constant while allowing the tax schedule to change.  This can be done by comparing D 
with A (pre-reform income held constant) or B with C (post-reform income held constant). The counterfactuals E1 to G2 use 
income in year 2000 as the base; E1 through G1 uses the pre-reform tax schedule to calculate net income while E2 to G2 uses the 
post-reform tax schedule. 
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PIT progressivity 
Measures of tax progressivity can be broadly classified into two categories; 
structural and effective (Musgrave and Thin 1948).  Each category has several methods 
that can be used to calculate progressivity.44  Here we will discuss two such measures of 
effective progressivity before discussing the direct/indirect effects of the tax 
reform.  Table 11 shows how the ability of the pre-reform and post-reform PIT schedules 
to reduce income inequality changed over the sample period under study.  The first 
measure, percent change in the GINI coefficient captures the degree to which the tax 
schedules reduce the inequality in gross income by taking the difference between the 
GINI of individual reported gross contractual earnings and the GINI of net contractual 
earnings (Alm, Lee, and Wallace 2005).  The second is a measure of effective 
progressivity defined as ba GG −− 11 , where Ga is the GINI of net income and Gb is the 
GINI of gross income; a value above (below) 1 indicates that the tax is progressive 
(regressive) (Musgrave and Thin 1948).  Panel A of Table 11 applies the pre-reform tax 
schedule to gross income in each year while Panel B uses the post-reform tax schedule.  
This implies that each panel captures the effectiveness of each tax schedule to reduce 
inequality over time.   
The results show that the graduated tax schedule of the pre-reform era is more 
effective at reducing income inequality than the linear post-reform schedule.  In fact, the 
effectiveness of the pre-reform schedule increases over the sample period while the post-
reform schedule becomes less effective.  For example, the pre-reform PIT schedule 
                                                 
44 For example, Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2008), use two measures of structural progressivity, which 
does not rely on any information about the distribution of income. 
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reduced inequality, as measured by the GINI coefficient, by 4 percent in 2000. This is 
compared to a 2.7 percent decline that would have taken place had the post-reform PIT 
schedule existed in the year 2000.  A similar comparison for the remaining years reveal 
that the pre-reform schedule out performs the post-reform schedule throughout the 
sample period.  The implications of these results are addressed in the next sections where 
we decompose the change in the distribution of income across periods into direct and 
indirect effects. 
 
 
Table 11. Progressivity of PIT Schedules 
 Panel A: Pre-reform Tax Schedule 
Income year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Gross income 0.3620 0.3342 0.3189 0.3081 0.3013 
Net income 0.3475 0.3207 0.3016 0.2907 0.2832 
Percent change in GINI -4.0161 -4.0428 -5.4245 -5.6619 -6.0174 
Effective progressivity 1.0228 1.0203 1.0254 1.0252 1.0260 
 Panel B: Post-reform Tax Schedule 
Gross income 0.3620 0.3342 0.3189 0.3081 0.3013 
Net income 0.3521 0.3277 0.3150 0.3053 0.2994 
Percent change in GINI -2.7372 -1.9203 -1.2299 -0.9167 -0.6556 
Effective progressivity 1.0155 1.0096 1.0058 1.0041 1.0028 
Observations 4176 4724 4949 5095 5213 
Note: Reported are the within period differences between gross income and net income GINI 
coefficients, and a measure of effective progressivity.  Effective progressivity is calculated as 1 
minus after tax GINI divided by 1 minus before tax GINI (Musgrave and Thin 1948).  All 
calculations are for non-zero values of imputed contractual earnings at the individual level. 
 
 
Direct Vs Indirect Effect 
Decomposing the total change in net income inequality between 2000 and 2002 
into its direct and indirect effects is done using the counterfactuals in panel A of Table 
10.  For example, we calculate the net income that would be observed if the post-reform 
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gross income existed in the pre-reform period (counterfactual C in panel A of Table 10).  
As indicated in panel C of Table 10, the direct tax effect can be measured by comparing 
the counterfactual net income labeled D with the net income distribution observed in the 
pre-reform year.  The indirect effect, on the other hand, is obtained by comparing 
counterfactual C with the net income distribution observed in the pre-reform year.  The 
results from this exercise are reported in Table 12. 
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Table 12. Distributional Impact of the Flat Tax Reform: Direct Vs. Indirect Effect 
Tax Year 2000 2002 2000 2002  Total 
effect 
Indirect 
effect 
Direct 
effect Income Year 2000 2002 2002 2000  
Panel A: Individual GINI Coefficient % change in GINI
Contractual Earnings 0.4812 0.4402 0.4230 0.489 -8.515 -12.091 1.623 
Panel B: Household   
Consumption 0.495 0.449 0.447 0.497  -9.395 -9.857 0.350 
Income 0.479 0.445 0.433 0.486  -7.089 -9.616 1.408 
Notes: Reported are the GINI coefficients in levels and percent changes.  The sample is restricted to non-zero values 
for each variable; imputed contractual labor earnings at the individual level and durable plus non-durable consumption 
and reported income before public transfers at the household level.  Decompositions are calculated as follows: the total 
effect is the change between the first two columns, the indirect effect is the change between columns one and three, 
and the direct effect is the change between columns one and four.  All changes are in percent. 
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Panel A of Table 12 reports the results for individual level reported imputed 
contractual earnings.  The results show that inequality declined between the year 2000 
and 2002; the GINI fell from 0.48 to 0.45.  We decompose this total change into direct 
and indirect effects and find that indirect behavioral responses are the primary reasons for 
the decline.  The change in the distribution of gross income between 2000 and 2002 
would have led to a 12 percent decline in the GINI coefficient of net income had the pre-
reform tax schedule existed in 2002.  The direct effect, on the other hand, would have 
increased the GINI by 1.6 percent had the post reform tax schedule existed in the year 
2000.  Similar results are observed in Panel B where the analysis is at the household level 
using durable plus non-durable consumption as a proxy for actual net income and 
reported net income before public transfers.  The direct effect had a relatively larger 
impact on consumption while the indirect effect is approximately equal for both measures 
of income.  
Tax-Induced Indirect Effect 
The results in Table 12 are consistent with previous work in this area (Alm, Lee, 
and Wallace 2005; Poterba 2007).45  However, it is important to note that the indirect 
effect includes responses that are tax-induced as well as responses that are induced by 
other factors unrelated to the change in the tax schedule.  This section identifies the tax-
induced portion of the indirect effects under two separate assumptions; that there is tax 
evasion and that there is no tax evasion. 
                                                 
45 These results remain consistent across inequality indices, measures of income, and choice of post-reform 
year. 
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The last column of Table 13 reports the percent change in the GINI coefficient 
assuming there is no tax evasion.  That is, we treat the tax-induced change in reported 
gross income as a real change in total income available to the individual/household and 
adjust income using the reported gross income elasticity; GMP estimates this elasticity to 
be -0.21.46  The results show that the tax induced change in reported gross income led to 
a 15.8 percent increase in the GINI coefficient of individual contractual earnings.  In 
other words, tax induced responses, under the assumption that there is no tax evasion, 
increased inequality in each measure of net income at both the individual and household 
level.  This result is in line with expectations given that the tax reform induced 
individuals in the right tail of the income distribution to increase their reported income.47 
As discussed in the empirical strategy, using this elasticity to determine the 
distributional impact of a tax reform will lead to biased estimates because it fails to 
distinguish between evasion and real productivity responses.  We distinguish between 
these responses by using the counterfactuals in panel B of Table 10.  Before applying the 
relevant tax schedules, we adjust the gross income of year 2000 using the procedure 
outlined in appendix C.  We set the baseline parameter values equal to 0.26, -0.04, and 
0.25, for evasion and productivity elasticities and evasion share, respectively; elasticities 
are from GMP and the evasion share is from Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm (2005). 
 
 
46 The important thing to note here is that no distinction is made between the various behavioral responses; 
real productivity responses and evasion responses are treated as one and the same.  
 
47 Only individuals earning above 50,000 rubles were affected by the tax reform; see Table 8.  GMP finds 
that individuals affected by the rate changes increased their reported income relative to those not affected 
by the reform.  Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2010) also find evidence that labor supply increased among 
males who were affected by the rate changes relative to those not affected. 
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Table 13. Distributional Impact of the Flat Tax Reform: Tax-Induced Behavioral Effects 
 Levels Indirect effect when π>0  Indirect 
effect 
when 
π=0 
Tax Schedule 2000 2000 2000 2000 Evasion 
effect 
Real 
effect 
Combined 
effect 
 
Adjustment None Evasion Real Both  
Panel A: Individual GINI Coefficient % change in GINI 
Contractual Earnings 0.4812 0.5169 0.5040 0.5356 7.4251 4.7386 11.3207 15.8223
Panel B: Household     
Consumption 0.4954 0.4949 0.5038 0.5029 -0.1003 1.6886 1.5085 9.2662 
Income 0.4792 0.5049 0.4951 0.5198 5.3540 3.3180 8.4710 6.5628 
Notes: Reported are the GINI coefficients in levels and percent changes.  The sample is restricted to non-zero values for each variable; 
imputed contractual labor earnings at the individual level and durable plus non-durable consumption and reported income before public 
transfers at the household level.  Decompositions are calculated as follows: the evasion effect is the change between the first two columns 
(assumes productivity response is zero), the real (productivity) effect is the change between columns one and three (assumes evasion 
response is zero), and the total effect is the change between columns one and four (assumes both productivity and evasion responds).  The 
last column reports the tax-induced indirect effect if evasion is ignored; i.e., it lumps the evasion and productivity responses together 
using the elasticity of reported gross income.  Adjustments are made using the following baseline parameters: evasion elasticity 0.26, 
productivity elasticity -0.04, and reported gross income elasticity -0.21 from GMP; evasion as a share of true income 0.25 is from 
Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm (2005).  All changes are in percent. 
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One of the main problems encountered when adjusting gross income for evasion 
and productivity is the application of the elasticities.  All tax liability figures have to be 
calculated at the individual level while the parameters are estimated at the household 
level.  For example, suppose that evasion is the only tax induced behavioral response to 
the reform.  Estimating the distributional impact of this response on household net 
income requires information on the gross income and tax liability implied by the evasion 
response.  Therefore, the first step is to obtain the household gross income implied by the 
evasion response.  As discussed above, this can only be done if we have individual level 
gross income, making individual level evasion elasticity the more suitable parameter.  To 
get around this problem, we assume that the evasion elasticity for each household applies 
to each member of that household.48   
The adjustments also apply the same evasion share to everyone.  While this is a 
strong assumption, we believe that it works in our favor because only individuals with 
income above 50,000 rubles are affected by the reform.  Therefore, the results if we were 
to apply the evasion share by deciles, for example, should be stronger than those reported 
here.   
The results reported in Table 13 show that distinguishing between evasion and 
real productivity responses is important when analyzing the distributional impact of a PIT 
rate change.  First, we find that the combined effect of evasion and real productivity 
responses increases inequality in both reported net income and consumption.  In other 
                                                 
48 Since the estimated elasticity is for the average household, we are implicitly assuming that this is 
representative of the average individual.  This is a strong assumption.  Since the GMP method on which we 
rely can only be applied at the household level, we have no alternative.  A similar procedure is followed for 
productivity.  The reader should keep this in mind when interpreting the results.  See the simulation 
appendix for details on the procedure. 
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words, tax-induced behavioral responses, like the direct effect, led to an increase in net 
income inequality.  The implication of this result is that non-tax related factors are the 
main driving force behind the decline in income inequality in Russia over the sample 
period.49   
The importance of separating the evasion from the real productivity effects is also 
made clear by comparing columns 5 and 6 of Table 13.  Such a comparison shows that 
the evasion effect is relatively larger than the real productivity effect regardless of 
income measure and unit of analysis.  This suggest that a relatively larger share of the 
tax-induced increase in reported net income inequality at both the individual and 
household levels is being driven by increased reporting among those affected by the tax 
reform.  For example, inequality in imputed contractual earnings (Panel A of Table 13), 
as measured by the GINI coefficient, increases by 7.4 percent if evasion is the only 
response compared to 4.7 percent when productivity responses are the only behavioral 
effect.  A similar pattern is observed for reported household income in Panel B.  Since the 
evasion response involves shifting existing income, it represents an artificial change in 
the distribution of reported net income thus leading to an overestimate of the 
distributional impact of the reform. As such, we argue that policy prescriptions should be 
based on the contribution of the real productivity effect instead of the combined effect. 
The second argument in favor of decomposing the tax-induced indirect effect into 
evasion and real productivity effects is evident from panel B of Table 13.  We compare 
the distributional impact of the evasion effect on reported net income with its effect on 
actual net income (approximated by consumption).  The results show that the evasion 
                                                 
49 Gorodnichenko, Sabirianova Peter, and Stolyarov (2009) provide a detail discussion of the trends in 
inequality in Russia between 1994 and 2005 including possible factors that may have contributed to the 
decline.  
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effect reduces consumption GINI by 0.1 percent while increasing reported net income 
GINI by 5.4 percent.  Another obvious difference is that evasion has a much smaller 
effect on consumption than on reported income.  Furthermore, the combined evasion and 
productivity effect is much larger for reported income than for consumption; GINI 
increase by 8.5 percent for reported income compared to 1.5 percent for consumption.  
These results are in line with expectation since evasion can only affect actual net income 
through income shifting while the reported net income is directly affected by both 
evasion and productivity.  That is, the nature of the Russian PIT reform led to a relative 
decline (increase) in hidden (reported) income among the rich, which then caused a 
decline (increase) in actual (reported) net income inequality.  The productivity effect, on 
the other hand, increased both actual and reported net income disproportionately among 
the rich.  Therefore, tax policies that ignore the distinction between evasion and 
productivity responses as well as the distinction between actual and reported net income 
are likely to lead to incorrect policy prescriptions. 
Robustness checks 
 The results discussed here are qualitatively the same regardless of 
income/consumption measure, parameter values chosen, and inequality index.  
Furthermore, the size of the parameters used in the analysis affect the results in an 
intuitive way.  For example, the results in Table 14 show that the artificial change in 
reported net income inequality increases with the share of income evaded and the 
responsiveness of evasion to PIT rate changes.  As expected, varying the evasion 
parameters have little effect on consumption inequality while the size of the productivity 
response matters.  For example, a productivity elasticity of -0.1 increases consumption 
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GINI by 4.3 percent compared to an increase of only 1.7 percent when the productivity 
elasticity is -0.04.  Robustness checks shown in Table B 4 are qualitatively the same as 
those discussed here.  We conduct several additional robustness checks using various 
measures of income and consumption that control for savings, public transfers, home 
production, and service value of own home consumption.  These checks all support the 
results presented here and are available upon request.  We also restrict the analysis to 
individuals with non-zero vales for imputed contractual earnings and find similar results. 
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Table 14. Sensitivity Analysis of Tax-Induced Behavioral Effects 
Parameters Contractual Earnings Consumption 
π ε(e) ε(y)  
Evasion 
effect 
Real 
effect 
Combined 
effect  
Evasion 
effect 
Real 
effect 
Combined 
effect  
0.20 0.26 -0.04  5.7034 4.4585 9.5526 -0.0895 1.6982 1.5429 
0.25 0.26 -0.04  7.4251 4.7386 11.3207 -0.1003 1.6886 1.5085 
0.30 0.26 -0.04  9.2907 5.0562 13.2319 -0.0942 1.6780 1.4899 
          
0.25 0.20 -0.04  5.8393 4.7386 9.9134 -0.0907 1.6886 1.5353 
0.25 0.30 -0.04  8.4427 4.7386 12.2255 -0.1005 1.6886 1.4967 
          
0.25 0.26 0.00  7.4251 0.0000 7.4251 -0.1003 0.0000 -0.1003 
0.25 0.26 -0.10  7.4251 10.8599 16.4149 -0.1003 4.2874 3.9936 
Notes: Reported are percent changes in GINI coefficients.  The sample is restricted to non-zero values for each variable; 
imputed contractual labor earnings at the individual level, and durable plus non-durable consumption and income before public 
transfers at the household level.  Decompositions are calculated as described in the notes to Table 13.   
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Table 14– Continued. 
Parameters Income 
π ε(e) ε(y)  
Evasion 
effect 
Real 
effect 
Combined 
effect 
0.20 0.26 -0.04 4.0378 3.1116 7.0324 
0.25 0.26 -0.04 5.3540 3.3180 8.4710 
0.30 0.26 -0.04 6.8227 3.5535 10.0651 
      
0.25 0.20 -0.04 4.1404 3.3180 7.3235 
0.25 0.30 -0.04 6.1493 3.3180 9.2206 
      
0.25 0.26 0.00 5.3540 0.0000 5.3540 
0.25 0.26 -0.10 5.3540 8.0927 12.8113 
 
 
Conclusion 
Numerous researchers have identified the fact that tax payers change their 
behavior in response to changes in tax rates.  While these behavioral changes are at the 
core of studies that look at efficiency and optimal tax policy, little is known about their 
impact on the relationship between tax rates and the distribution of income.  Additionally, 
the existing literature either fails to identify the distributional impact of tax-induced 
behavioral responses all together or ignore some dimensions.  In particular, the 
distributional impact of tax-induced changes in evasion remains an unexplored area in the 
empirical literature.  We attempt to bridge this gap in the literature by decomposing the 
change income inequality into direct and indirect effects.  The indirect effect is further 
decomposed into tax-induced evasion and productivity effects using elasticities of 
evasion and productivity.  The analysis also distinguishes between reported income and 
actual income (consumption) inequality. 
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The analysis focuses on Russia due to strict data requirements.  In particular, we 
use data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey to study the distributional 
impact of the Russian flat tax reform.  Focusing the analysis on Russia is advantageous 
because there is an actual flat tax reform to analyze, the RLMS has very rich data on 
consumption and income, and evasion and productivity elasticities are available; the latter 
two are crucial for our analysis. 
We find that the switch to a flat PIT reduced the ability of the PIT to equalize net 
income and that the post-reform PIT’s ineffectiveness worsens over the sample period.  
The results also show that mechanical changes in the tax rates had a relatively smaller 
effect on the distribution of income compared to indirect behavioral responses, which 
actually reduced income inequality.  We identify the tax-induced portion of the indirect 
effect by using the evasion and productivity elasticities to estimate a series of 
counterfactual reported and actual net income measures at the household level.  Net 
income is approximated by consumption.  The results from this analysis show that the 
combined effect of evasion and productivity is positive, i.e., led to an increase in income 
inequality.  However, further analysis reveals that the evasion effect is relatively larger 
than the productivity effect for reported net income but smaller for actual net income.  In 
fact, we find that while tax induced changes in evasion led to an increase in reported net 
income, they reduced actual net income inequality. 
These results have very serious policy implications especially for policy makers 
currently contemplating the adoption of a flat/flatter PIT schedule.  First, it is important 
that a distinction be made between evasion and real productivity effects.  Failure to do so 
will lead to an overestimation of the distributional impact of tax rate changes and can 
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result in incorrect policy advice.  This distinction is particularly relevant in countries with 
very high levels of evasion.  The results also show that tax-induced changes in behavior 
are not as important as are other factors that affect earning potential.  For example, it may 
be more useful to invest in education and other training programs that improve the 
employability of working age individuals than to rely on the tax schedule as a tool for 
redistributing income.   
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation provides an empirical analysis of the relationship between the 
structural progressivity of personal income taxes and income inequality, with a special 
emphasis on the differential effect of progressivity on observed versus actual inequality.  
Although much work has been done to assess the impact of tax reforms on the 
distribution of income, this is the first known attempt to differentiate between these two 
effects.   
The first essay examines whether income inequality is affected by the structural 
progressivity of national income tax systems.  The key prediction of our theoretical 
framework is that progressivity affects observed inequality differently than it does true 
inequality, and that the difference between the two inequality effects is increasing with 
the extent of tax evasion and its responsiveness to tax changes, ceteris paribus.  To test 
these hypotheses, we use a country-level dataset of GINI coefficients calculated 
separately for gross income, net income, and consumption.  We also use detailed personal 
income tax schedules for a large panel of countries to develop and estimate 
comprehensive, time-varying measures of structural progressivity of national income tax 
systems over the 1981–2005 period.   
Our empirical analysis reveals that while progressivity reduces observed 
inequality in reported gross and net income, it has a significantly smaller impact on 
inequality in consumption.  We theorize that the “positive” effect of progressivity on true 
inequality is possible, especially in the presence of weak legal institutions that can trigger 
a very large tax evasion response.  The evidence provides some support for our 
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hypothesis as we show that weaker law and order produces a positive effect on inequality 
in consumption.  As expected, we find that progressivity has a larger negative effect on 
net income inequality than on gross income inequality.  
The second essay complements the first in its empirical approach, but relies on 
household rather than country level data.  We simulate the distributional impact of the 
Russian personal income tax (PIT) following the flat tax reform of 2001 using data from 
the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey.  We use a series of counterfactuals to 
decompose the change in the distribution of net income into a direct (tax) effect and an 
indirect behavioral effect.  The indirect effect is further decomposed into evasion and 
productivity effects using existing estimates of these respective elasticities.  Again, a 
distinction is made between reported income and true income (approximated by 
consumption) inequality.   
As expected, the direct tax effect increased net income inequality.  Changes in the 
pre-tax distribution (indirect effect), on the other hand, had a large negative impact on 
inequality thus leading to an overall decline in net income inequality.  We also find that 
the tax-induced evasion response increased reported net income inequality while reducing 
consumption based measures of net income inequality.  To the extent that consumption 
approximates true income, these results demonstrate that the PIT affects true income 
inequality differently than it does reported income inequality.  The results further imply 
that countries with very large informal sectors may not be restricted by the equity 
efficiency trade-off and that redistribution policy should target gross income rather than 
the progressivity of the tax schedule. 
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Both essays together make clear that the popular efficiency equity trade-off 
related to tax progressivity is weaker than we think.  These results are especially true for 
countries with weak tax administrative institutions.  This conclusion becomes obvious 
once it is recognized that changes in inequality that arise from changes in evasion are 
artificial.  In other words, observed inequality can increase if a lower tax rate causes rich 
tax payers to report a relatively greater share of their income.  This increase in inequality 
represents a shift toward the true inequality that existed prior to the tax change.  
Therefore, to the extent that this “artificial” effect is relatively large, the actual equity 
cost of the efficiency gained from switching to a flatter tax schedule will be much lower 
than observed.  In this case, it is optimal to adopt a flatter tax schedule not only because it 
is more efficient but also because the true equity effects are smaller than commonly 
assumed.  
Therefore, knowing if and how taxes affect the distribution of income and 
consumption is important for policy makers as they attempt to strike an important balance 
between efficiency and equity. 
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APPENDIX A: THEORETICAL APPENDIX 
A1: General utility model 
Assuming the utility function is separable in consumption and income is a 
particularly restrictive assumption.  In this section we derive the main theoretical results 
with a more general utility function and show that the conclusions are not greatly affected 
by the simplification imposed in the main text.  The utility function has the same 
properties as before except that separability is relaxed.  Therefore, we write the utility 
function as .  The individual’s objective is to  ( yCUU ,= )
( ) ( ) ( )yCUyCUMax ,,1EU 21 ρρ +−=  
subject to equations (1.1) and (1.2), and   0,0 ≥≥ yE
Differentiating with respect to y and E yields 
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[ ] 0111 /2//1/ ≤+−++−−=∂∂ yUtCUyUtCUyEU ρρ    A1 
( ) ( ) ( ) 01 22/1/ ≤∂
∂
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CCUtCU
E
EU ρρ
    
  A2 
Both equations are satisfied with equality for interior solutions.  The earnings and 
evasion functions are implicitly defined by these equations.  Also, unlike the simple 
model, evasion is function of earnings and vice-versa.  It has been shown in the existing 
literature that comparative statics in this setting produces ambiguous results (Cowell 
1985).   
An implication of this more complicated functional form is that eq. (9) and (16) 
will have extra terms (cross elasticities) in them that cannot be easily signed.  
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Ignoring these elasticity terms is likely to create a bias in the results that may affect the 
conclusions drawn in the main text.  Therefore, knowledge of the sign and potential 
magnitude of this bias is important if we are to have any confidence in the results derived 
in the text.  We show below that the bias created is most likely to be positive and very 
close to zero. 
Consider the following simple illustration.  Define the Kuznets inequality index as 
follows 
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If we substitute eq. (A6) into eq. (A5) and pull out the cross terms, we get 
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 and [ ]oyrr Ittb α−−= 1 .  The sign of the first term is negative if 
the transfer effect (the second term) is positive or zero, the evasion response, 
r
rE
τ∂
∂
, is 
positive, and the income response, 
r
rY
τ∂
∂ *
, is negative.50  The objective of this section is to 
sign the third term, which requires knowledge of the sign of the cross terms.  There is 
very little empirical evidence on the sign of these cross terms.  Although it is possible to 
sign the income and evasion responses using current empirical evidence, signing the 
cross terms (effect of evasion on hours worked and vice versa) is difficult to obtained as 
we are not aware of any empirical work that directly estimate these relationships.51  One 
solution would be to assume that higher income makes it easier to evade a given amount 
of income.  Slemrod (2001) uses a similar assumption which he termed “the avoidance 
                                                 
50 Since G is assumed to be a constant function of total tax revenues, a positive transfer effect simply means 
that higher taxes results in greater revenues.  However, this is not necessarily an innocuous assumption.  
Changes in the tax rate will have two opposing effects on total revenue.  Similar to a price change, there is 
a direct effect that moves in the same direction as the tax rate and an indirect effect (change in the tax base) 
that moves in the opposite direction of the tax rate.  These effects are similar to those that affect the 
distribution of income.  Therefore, if the tax base is very responsive to the tax rate then the transfer effect 
may be negative.  This would imply that we are on the downward sloping section of the Laffer curve.  
 
51 The closest empirical work we have found tries to estimate the effect of taxes and wage rates in the 
formal sector on the supply of labor to the underground sector.  These same studies also estimate the effect 
of wage rates in the underground sector on labor supply to the formal sector (Frederiksen, Graversen, and 
Smith 2005; Lemieux, Fortin, and Frechette 1994). 
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facilitating effect of income.”52  This assumption implies that the cross terms are positive.  
If we further assume that the evasion and income responses are positive and negative, 
respectively, then we can conclude that Z<0.  On the other hand, b is positive if 
( )oyr It α+> 11  and negative otherwise.  Despite the uncertainty about the sign of b,
b
Gopy
Z
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +
 is likely to be zero since 0≈
+ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Gopy
Z .  Therefore, any bias created by 
omitting the cross elasticities is also likely to be very small. 
                                                 
52 Slemrod’s application is between avoidance and labor supply.  He argues that it is very likely that income 
has an avoidance facilitating effect.  In other words, increased income makes it easier to avoid given 
amount of income.   
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A2 Inequality index with transfers 
In this appendix we include transfers in the definition of net income.  The variance of log 
income is define as in the text with the exception that transfers are now included as an 
additional source of income. 
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reported net income,  is true earned income, and B is government transfers and is 
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Totally differentiate eq.(9) with respect to ti to get the following.53 
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Since neither true income nor evasion is known, we rewrite eq. (A10) as 
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53We are assuming that individual i’s tax rate does not affect individual k’s behavior.   
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where *
i
i y
Θ=Γ .  Equation (A11) will be used to simulate the change in inequality.  This 
follows since ( )( )
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1 1*  where *
i
i
i y
E=π .  Assuming thatα  remains 
constant, the sign of the transfer effect depends on which section of the Laffer curve we 
are on.  If an increase in tax rates leads to an increase in tax revenues then inequality 
should decline via the transfer effect.54  As in the theoretical section, the effect of transfer 
on income inequality depends on who finances it.  If the increase in transfers is financed 
by a tax on individuals below mean income, the effect will be negative, that is, inequality 
increases.  The opposite happens if financed by tax on individuals above mean income.  
The other effects –direct and indirect – are the same as in the main text.
                                                 
54 Since B is assumed to be a constant function of total tax revenues, a positive transfer effect simply means 
that higher taxes results in greater revenues.  However, this is not necessarily an innocuous assumption.  
Changes in the tax rate will have two opposing effects on total revenue.  Similar to a price change, there is 
a direct effect that moves in the same direction as the tax rate and an indirect effect (change in the tax base) 
that moves in the opposite direction of the tax rate.  These effects are similar to those that affect the 
distribution of income.  Therefore, if the tax base is very responsive to the tax rate then the transfer effect 
may be negative.  This would imply that we are on the downward sloping section of the Laffer curve.  
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APPENDIX B: TABLE APPENDIX 
 
Table B 1. Sample Composition 
Categories of the GINI Selected Sample Estimation Sample 
Income base   
Consumption 0.200 0.186 
Gross income 0.344 0.337 
Net income 0.456 0.477 
Income adjustment   
Equivalence scale  0.259 0.278 
Per capita adjustment 0.490 0.465 
No adjustment 0.221 0.230 
Unknown 0.030 0.027 
Area coverage   
National 0.931 0.927 
Urban or national with exclusions 0.042 0.043 
Other 0.027 0.030 
Data quality   
1 – underlying concepts known 
and judged sufficient  0.393 0.418 
2 - income concept or survey is 
problematic or unknown or 
estimates not verified  
 0.315 0.317 
3 - income concept and survey are 
problematic or unknown 0.292 0.265 
N (GINI observations) 1683 1538 
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Table B 2. Description of Variables 
Variable Name Description of Variables and Data Sources 
GINI coefficient The measure of income inequality used is the GINI Coefficient 
reported by WIIDER, WDI, ILO and EUROSTAT. 
Tax variables 
Source: All tax variables are from World Tax Indicators v.1. 
Top statutory PIT rate (%) Legally determined marginal tax rate applicable to the top 
bracket of the personal income tax schedule. 
ARP1 ARP1 characterizes the structural progressivity of national tax 
schedules with respect to the changes in average rates along the 
income distribution.  It is the slope coefficient from regressing 
actual average tax rates on the log of gross income for the 
income distribution up to 4⋅y income, where y is a country’s GDP 
per capita. 
ARP2 Average rate progression for the income distribution up to 2⋅y 
income. 
MRP1 MRP1 characterizes the structural progressivity of national tax 
schedules with respect to the changes in marginal rates along the 
income distribution.  It is the slope coefficient from regressing 
actual marginal tax rates on the log of gross income for the 
income distribution up to 4⋅y income. 
MRP2 Marginal rate progression for the income distribution up to 2⋅y 
income. 
Institutional variables 
Law and order The law and order index is an assessment of the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system as well as an assessment of 
popular observance of the law.  The index is on the scale from 0 
to 6, with 0 representing the worst law and order. 
Source:  International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
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Table B 2– Continued. 
Variable Name Description of Variables and Data Sources 
Civil liberties The civil liberties index gives an indication of the extent to which 
individuals are allowed “… freedoms of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy without interference from the state.”  The original index 
is reversed on the scale from 1-7, with 1 representing no freedom.  
Source:  Freedom House  
Political rights The political rights index gives an indication of the extent to 
which individuals are allowed “… to participate freely in the 
political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct 
alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join 
political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who 
have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to 
the electorate.”  The original index is reversed on the scale from 
1-7, with 1 representing no freedom.   
Source:  Freedom House 
Democracy score This is the revised POLITY IV score constructed from two other 
indices; autocracy (AUTOC) and democracy (DEMOC).  
Democracy indicates the general openness of political institutions, 
while autocracy indicates the general closeness of political 
institutions.  The POLITY IV score is measured on a scale from -
10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic).  
Source: Center for International Development and Conflict Management 
(CIDCM) 
Other control variables 
GDP per capita (log) Log of GDP per capita.  Gross Domestic Product per capita is 
calculated using GDP (in US$ at 1990 prices) divided by country 
population. 
Sources:  United Nations Common Database (UNCD). 
Inflation rate (%) Percentage change in annual CPI. 
Sources:  IMF IFS (2006), IMF WEO (2006), ILO Laborsta (2006), EIU 
(2005), and IMF WEO annual reports 
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Table B 2– Continued. 
Variable Name Description of Variables and Data Sources 
Services (% of GDP) Service sector’s value added as a share of GDP.  Services include 
wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels; transport, 
storage and communication; financing, insurance, real estate and 
business services; public administration and defense; community, 
social and personal services.  This sector is derived as a residual 
(from GDP less agriculture and industry).   
Sources:  WB WDI (2007) supplemented by EIU (2005), UNECE 
(2007), ECLAC (2005) and publications of national statistical offices. 
Industry (% of GDP) Industry sector’s value added as a share of GDP.  Industry 
includes mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, 
and gas.  
Sources:  WB WDI (2007) supplemented by EIU (2005), UNECE 
(2007), ECLAC (2005) and publications of national statistical offices. 
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Figure B 1. Sample Composition of the GINI by Income Base 
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Table B 3. Variable Description and Notes 
 Variable Name Definition Notes 
Individual Income 
IMP Imputed contractual labor 
earnings per month 
 Labor earnings of working-age non-respondents are 
imputed as predicted earnings times the predicted 
probability of working using the full set of 
interactions between the four age groups (18-60) and 
two gender groups and controlling for urban and 
federal district dummies for each year separately. 
Household Income 
yL Contractual labor earnings 
per month  
= sum of IMP within each 
household. 
 
y Household income before 
government transfers 
= yL + net private transfers + 
financial income received last 
month. 
“Private transfers received” include received 
alimonies and 11 subcategories of contributions from 
persons outside the household unit, including 
contributions from relatives, friends, charity, 
international organizations, etc.  “Private transfers 
given” include alimonies paid and various 
contributions in money and in kind given to 
individuals outside the household unit (6 categories). 
Financial income includes dividends on stocks and 
interest on bank accounts. 
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Table B 3– Continued. 
 Variable Name Definition Notes 
Household Consumption 
C Non-durable expenditures Sum of expenditures on non-durables in the 
last 30 days.  Non-durable items include food, 
alcohol, tobacco, clothing and footwear, 
gasoline and other fuel expenses, rents and 
utilities, and 15-20 subcategories of services 
(such as transportation, repair, health care 
services, education, entertainment, recreation, 
insurance, etc.). 
 
cD Aggregate expenditures = c + expenditures on durables in the last 3 
months/3.  Durable items include 10 
subcategories such as major appliances, 
vehicles, furniture, entertainment equipment, 
etc. 
 
This is compared with 
purchases of goods and services 
from NIPA 
 
Source: With permission from Gorodnichenko, Sabirianova-Peter, and Stolyarov (2009) 
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Table B 4. Distributional Impact of the Flat Tax Reform: Tax-Induced Behavioral effects 
Parameters Contractual Earnings (IMP) Consumption (cD) 
π ε(e) ε(y)  
Evasion 
effect 
Real 
effect 
Combined 
effect  
Evasion 
effect 
Real 
effect 
Combined 
effect 
0.20 -0.26 -0.04  3.974 4.459 9.553 -0.236 1.272 1.018 
0.25 -0.26 -0.04  5.188 4.739 11.321 -0.259 1.255 1.019 
0.30 -0.26 -0.04  6.511 5.056 13.232 -0.197 1.235 1.307 
          
0.25 -0.20 -0.04  4.070 3.297 6.953 -0.240 1.255 1.011 
0.25 -0.30 -0.04  5.908 3.297 8.610 -0.242 1.255 1.080 
          
0.25 -0.26 0.00  5.188 0.000 5.188 -0.259 0.000 -0.259 
0.25 -0.26 -0.10  5.188 7.630 11.648 -0.259 3.150 2.792 
Notes: Reported are percent changes in variance of log coefficients.  The sample is restricted to non-zero values for each 
variable; imputed contractual labor earnings at the individual level, and durable plus non-durable consumption and income 
before public transfers at the household level.  Decompositions are calculated as described in the notes to Table 6 (also see 
Table 3). 
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Table B 4– Continued. 
Parameters    Income (y) 
π ε(e) ε(y)   Evasion effect 
Real 
effect 
Combined 
effect 
0.20 -0.26 -0.04 2.761 2.146 4.705 
0.25 -0.26 -0.04 3.623 2.284 5.619 
0.30 -0.26 -0.04 4.571 2.441 6.621 
      
0.25 -0.20 -0.04 2.829 2.284 4.890 
0.25 -0.30 -0.04 4.138 2.284 6.091 
      
0.25 -0.26 0.00 3.623 0.000 3.623 
0.25 -0.26 -0.10 3.623 5.379 8.324 
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APPENDIX C: SIMULATION APPENDIX  
Introduction 
The purpose of this document is to outline the mechanical procedure used to 
determine the effect of personal income taxes (PIT) on the distribution of income.  We 
demonstrate how various counterfactuals of net income are calculated and how gross 
income is adjusted to reflect changes in evasion and productivity.   
There are a number of problems that must be addressed in order to complete the 
analysis.  One of the main ones is the fact that the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey (RLMS) does not have direct measures of taxes paid, deductions, or gross 
income.  The data set collects reported net income and reported consumption. While both 
are likely to suffer from underreporting, consumption is used as an approximation of true 
net income (GMP; Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm 2005).  This implies that gross income 
(true and reported) can be obtained by inverting the tax function.  We use this inversion 
technique as a starting point to estimate reported gross income, which we then use to 
calculate counterfactual measures of net income.  The limitations mentioned above also 
imply that analyses focusing on true income can only be done at the household level 
since consumption data are only available at the household level.55  
We discuss net income counterfactuals that do not distinguish among behavioral 
effects next and follow this with a demonstration of how we adjust reported gross income 
so that the evasion effect can be distinguished from the productivity effect.  We then 
highlight the combination of counterfactuals used to identify the different components of 
                                                 
55 Other problems and assumptions are discussed throughout the text. For example, taxation is at the 
individual level, which makes household level analyses problematic.  We discuss this problem in more 
detail later in the text. 
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the change in income inequality.  This is followed by a description of the inversion 
process and the variables used in the analysis. 
Counterfactual net income  
In this section we outline how each counterfactual net income variable is 
calculated.  We first discuss counterfactuals that allow me to decompose the change in 
inequality into its direct and indirect components.56  We then discuss how gross income 
can be adjusted to allow for the evasion and productivity effects.  The analysis refers to 
years 2000 and 2001 only.  However, actual implementation includes other post-reform 
years.  We also make reference to counterfactuals at the individual (reported income) and 
household level (consumption based measures of true income).57   
In the expressions below, Y=income, E is hidden income, T is the tax function, εy 
is the true income elasticity, εe is the evasion elasticity, τ is the statutory marginal tax rate, 
and the subscripts i, h, n, g, t, and superscript * indicate individuals, households, net, 
gross, time, and true, respectively. 
No distinction among behavioral effects58: 
a. Net income under pre-reform tax schedule with pre-reform income (A): 
i. Individual: )( 20002000200020002000 iigigin DYTYY −−=  
ii. Household: ∑ −−=
i
iig DYTYY hghn )( 200020002000
**
20002000
 
                                                 
56 The direct component is due to the change in the tax rate and the indirect component is due to the change 
in income. 
 
57Although we do not present them here, the analysis will include reported income at the household level as 
well. 
 
58 Summation is within a given household.   
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b. Net income under post-reform tax schedule with post-reform income (B): 
i. Individual: )( 20012001200120012001 iigigin DYTYY −−=  
ii. Household: ∑ −−= i iig DYTYY hghn )( 200120012001** 20012001  
c. Net income under pre-reform tax schedule with post-reform income (C): 
i. Individual: )( 2000200120002001 iigiginc DYTYY −−=  
ii. Household: ∑ −−= i iig DYTYY hghnc )( 200020012000** 2001  
d. Net income under post-reform tax schedule with pre-reform income (D): 
i. Individual: )( 2001200020012000 iigigind DYTYY −−=  
ii. Household: ∑ −−= i iig DYTYY hghnd )( 200120002001** 2000  
Distinguishing among behavioral effects: 
Decomposition assumes evasion takes place and is observed.59  We first 
define the tax-induced change in both evasion and true gross income. 
a. Tax induced change in evasion is  
i. )1(        2000
'
i
i
ehh
i
i
ehtht EEEE τ
τετ
τε Δ×+=⇒Δ××=Δ  
b. Tax induced change in gross income is  
i. )1(        *'**
2000
i
i
yhgt
i
i
y hghgthgt
YYYY τ
τετ
τε Δ×+=⇒Δ××=Δ  
We then calculate net income allowing each component of reported gross income 
to change by the tax induced amount.  The calculation is done using both pre-reform and 
post-reform tax schedules.   
There are two problems that must be addressed when conducting this analysis. 
First, taxes are assessed on individuals, not households.  Therefore, adjustments for 
                                                 
59 It is possible to do these calculations even if evasion is not observed.  This is illustrated below. 
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evasion and productivity are required at the individual level when calculating tax liability 
even if the analysis is at the household level.  This poses a problem because the 
elasticities needed to make the adjustments are estimated at the household level.  Second, 
tax liability for individual i can be written as .  The behavioral effects 
are obtained by adjusting and according to the estimated elasticities outlined 
above.  However, we observe neither nor ; we are able to estimate .
)( * iii DEYTT ig −−=
igE
*
ig
Y igE
*
ig
Y iggig EYY i −= * 60  
As such, it is not possible to directly adjust the amount of evasion or true gross income as 
indicated above.   
Both problems are addressed by assuming that the percentage change in the 
amount of evasion at the household level applies to each working member of a given 
household.  This implies that the new level of reported income - due to the change in 
evasion - can be written as 
)1(*'
i
i
eig EYY iig τ
τε Δ×+−=  
which then implies that the percentage change in individual reported gross income due to 
the change in evasion is 
YEYYYY
i
i
higigigig =−×
Δ×−=−=Δ ππ
π
τ
τε        ;
1
/)(% '  
Similarly, the percentage change in individual reported gross income due to the change 
in productivity is 
                                                 
60 This is done by inverting the tax function. 
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πτ
τε −×
Δ×=Δ
1
1%
i
i
yigY
 
. 
Finally, the percentage change in individual reported gross income due to the change in 
both evasion and productivity is 
π
πεε
τ
τ
−
−×Δ=Δ
1
% ey
i
i
igY  
Although we do not knowπ , it is possible compute the counterfactuals based on different 
values of π .61   
With this in mind, we are able to write out the following;  
1. Reported gross income adjusted for evasion is 
]
1
[ π
π
τ
τε −×
Δ×−×+=
i
i
eigig
e
ig YYY  
2. Reported gross income adjusted for productivity is 
]
)1(
[ πτ
τε
−
Δ×+=
i
iy
igig
y
ig YYY  
3. Reported gross income adjusted for evasion and productivity is 
]
1
[ π
πεε
τ
τ
−
−×Δ×+= ey
i
i
igig
ey
ig YYY  
Using this same procedure, we calculate the change in true gross income (consumption) 
at the household level as62 
                                                 π .  It is possible to allow  61 GMP consider 1/3 to be a reasonable upper bound for π  to vary between 1/5 
and 1/3, for example.  
 
62 Note that true income is only adjusted for changes in productivity.  The implicit assumption here is that 
changes in evasion do not affect the amount of income earned except through its effect on individual tax 
liability.  This is quite reasonable since evasion usually involves a reallocation of what is earned.  Evasion 
may still have an indirect effect on how much is earned.  For example, an increase in the ability to evade 
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i
i
yhghg
y
hg YYY τ
τε Δ××+= **  
Reported household gross income is adjusted similarly to individual income.  The 
above procedure allows me to write down counterfactuals that we use to determine the 
size and sign of the evasion and productivity effects.63  We estimate the evasion effect, 
by comparing the pre-reform (year 2000) distribution of net income with the distribution 
of net income that would obtain if the only tax induced behavioral response to the tax 
reform was evasion.  The productivity effect is obtained similarly, except that we assume 
the only response is through productivity changes.  We also estimate the total behavioral 
effect by allowing both evasion and productivity to change simultaneously (calculations 
are summarized in Table 9 and Table 10). 
Change in inequality  
The change in inequality is determined by comparing several counterfactual 
measures of net income distribution (see Table 10).  The primary reason for using these 
counterfactuals is that they allow me to separate the total change in the distribution of 
income into the components of interest.  This approach is widely used in the literature 
(Alm, Lee, and Wallace 2005; Poterba 2007). 
                                                                                                                                                 
taxes may act as an incentive to increase earnings (Slemrod 2001).  However, we ignore these cross effects 
since there are no estimates available for them. 
 
63 The adjustments all use income in year 2000 as the base.  Additionally, we hold the tax schedule constant 
so that any change must be due to the change in income only; base calculations are done using the pre-
reform tax schedule.   
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No distinction among behavioral effects:  
Panel C of Table 10 illustrates how the various counterfactual net incomes are 
combined to decompose the change in income inequality into its various components.  
The direct (tax) effect is defined as the change in income inequality that results from a 
change in the tax schedule holding the pre-tax distribution constant.  Therefore, the direct 
effect can be estimated by comparing D and A (pre-reform income held constant) or B 
and C (post-reform income held constant).  The indirect (behavioral) effect, on the other 
hand, is the change in the distribution of income that follows from a change in the 
distribution of pre-tax income with the tax schedule held constant.  Again, this is 
estimated holding either the pre-reform tax schedule constant (compare C and A) or the 
post-reform tax schedule constant (compare B and D). 
Decomposing the indirect (behavioral) effects: 
The indirect effect obtained using the approach above included behavioral 
changes along many different dimensions.  While some of these responses are most likely 
induced by the change in the tax schedule, others are totally unrelated and would have 
taken place even if no reform took place.  The central objective of this essay is to 
determine how much of the indirect effect is tax-induced.  For example, we ask the 
question, what would be the net income distribution if individuals were induced to 
change only the amount of income they evade?  Similarly, what would be the resulting 
net income distribution if only tax-induced productivity responses took place?  These 
questions are answered by using the counterfactuals in Panel B of Table 10.  
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 For example, the distribution of net income when evasion is the only response, 
E1, is compared with the one that would have obtained had there been no change in the 
pre-reform income, A.64  This is illustrated in panel C of Table 10 where we compare E1 
with A (holding pre-reform tax schedule constant) and E2 with D (holding post-reform 
tax schedule constant).  The productivity effect is similarly calculated by allowing 
productivity to be the only tax induced behavioral response and adjusting pre-reform pre-
tax income accordingly.  Here we compare F1 with A, which holds the pre-reform tax 
schedule constant, and F2 with D, which hold the post-reform tax schedule constant.  
Implementation 
In this section we discuss the steps used to implement the analysis.  The analysis 
simulation exercise requires six steps.   
1. Determine the amount of deduction for each individual 
2. Invert the tax function to obtain gross income 
3. Adjust gross income for evasion and productivity 
4. Calculate the counterfactual net incomes outlined above 
5. Calculate the indices of net income distribution  
6. Calculate the change in distribution 
Each step is discussed in more detail below. 
Step 1:  Determine the amount of deduction for each individual 
Deduction for the year 2000 is summarized as follows:  
1. 264 rubles per month every month for which accumulated income (up to that 
month) is less than or equal to 20,000 rubles 
2. 132 rubles per month every month for which accumulated income is less than or 
equal to 50,000 rubles and greater than 20,000 rubles. 
3. Zero for remaining months 
                                                 
64 The net income distributions are calculated using both pre-reform (E1) and post-reform tax schedules 
(E2).  As such, the evasion effect can be obtained by comparing E1 with A, or E2 with D.  The same 
procedure is followed to obtain the productivity effect. 
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Deduction for the post-reform period is summarized as follows:  
1. 400 rubles per month every month for which accumulated income is less than or 
equal to 20,000 rubles 
2. Zero for remaining months  
The expressions below are based on the following assumptions: 
1. Since information is only available on income earned last month, we assume that 
income is received evenly throughout the year when accounting for these complex 
deduction rules (Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm 2005).  
2. The rule for year 2000 also applies to 1998 
Let d1 equal deduction while accumulated income is less than or equal to 20,000 
rubles and d2 equal deduction while accumulated income is less than or equal to 50,000 
rubles but greater than 20,000 rubles.  Given the rules above, 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
<
≥=
20000       )264(*12
20000       )264(*12*20000
1
ig
ig
ig
Yif
Yif
Yd  
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
<−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
≥=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
=
50000       )132(*
12*)30000(
  )132(*12*2000012
50000       )132(*12*30000  )132(*12*2000012*50000
2
ig
ig
ig
ig
ig
igigig
Yif
Y
Y
Y
Yif
YYY
d  
Define 
igY
C 12*20000=  and simplify deductions to get: 
Deductions before reform: 
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
≤<≤
<≤<≤
<≤<≤+
≤≥
=+=
ig
ig
ig
ig
21
Y150000 if     2C0 and                )462(*
150000Y50000 if     5C2 and                )462(*
50000Y20000 if  12C5  and     1584)132(*
20000Y if        12C  and               )264(*12
C
C
C
ddD
 
Deductions after reform: 
          
 00020 if       400*
 00020 if      400*12
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ >
≤=
,YC
,Y
D
ig
ig
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Step 2: Invert the tax function to obtain gross income 
 Gross income for each individual is imputed in STATA based on the PIT tax 
schedule summarized in Table 3 and the deductions outlined in step 1. 
Pre-reform (1998-2000): 
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎨
⎧
>−+−+
≤<−−+
≤<+−
≤<−
=
000,150 if     
69.0
31.0*000,15021.0*000,10013.0*)462*000,50(
000,15050,000 if     
79.0
21.0*000,5013.0*)462*000,50(
000,5020,000 if     
87.0
)1584132*(*13.0
000,203,168 if     
87.0
264*12*13.0
ig
ig
ig
ig
YCY
YCY
YCY
YY
Y
in
in
in
in
ig  
Post reform (2000-2004): 
⎩⎨
⎧ >−= 800,4 if     
87.0
400**13.0
igY
CYY inig  
Step 3: Adjust gross income for evasion and productivity  
The estimated gross income is adjusted for behavioral responses and used to 
determine counterfactual net income as described earlier.  The baseline adjustments set 
the evasion parameter (π) at 25 percent, evasion elasticity at 0.26, and the productivity 
elasticity at -0.04.65  The tax rates and change in tax rates are determined from Table 8.  
We place each individual (household) into a tax bracket based on their gross income and 
then assign the relevant tax rate. 
                                                 
65 Each of these parameters is adjusted in robustness checks.  Simulations allow π to be equal to 20 percent 
and 30 percent.  
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Step 4: Calculate the counterfactual net incomes 
The estimated gross income is used to determine counterfactual net income as 
described earlier while the adjusted gross income is used to determine counterfactual net 
income as described in Table 9.  
Step 5: Calculate inequality indices for net income  
With counterfactuals of net income determined, we calculate various measures of 
income inequality.  These include the GINI coefficient, the coefficient of variation (CV), 
the relative mean deviation (RMD), and variance of log.  We also calculate measures of 
effective progressivity.  All income/consumption measures are converted to December 
2002 prices, and household measures are adjusted using the OECD equivalence scale.  
Additionally, the individual (household) level inequality indices are calculated using the 
RLMS individual (household) sample weights to address sample attrition and other 
sampling errors.66 
Step 6: Calculate the change in inequality  
The decomposition involves two steps.  First, we identify the direct and indirect 
effects using the counterfactuals in panel A of Table 10.  Second, we use the 
counterfactuals in panel B of Table 10 to decompose the indirect effect into its evasion 
and productivity components.  This is similar in spirit to the approach taken by Poterba 
(2007) and Alm, Lee, and Wallace (2005).  In effect, we are able to see how the 
                                                 
66 The RLMS sample weights adjusts for sample design factors and deviations from the census 
characteristics, which implicitly address sample attrition. 
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distribution changes when, say, evasion changes, ceteris paribus.  The changes are 
calculated as percentages.  
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